Unbridled Managed Care: When Consumers Experience Antitrust Welfare Loss From Exclusionary Contracts Between HMO Insurers and Health Care Providers by Ruskin, Andrew
Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-
Medicine
Volume 6 | Issue 2
1996
Unbridled Managed Care: When Consumers
Experience Antitrust Welfare Loss From
Exclusionary Contracts Between HMO Insurers
and Health Care Providers
Andrew Ruskin
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-Medicine by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Andrew Ruskin, Unbridled Managed Care: When Consumers Experience Antitrust Welfare Loss From Exclusionary Contracts Between
HMO Insurers and Health Care Providers, 6 Health Matrix 391 (1996)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix/vol6/iss2/8
NOTES
UNBRIDLED MANAGED CARE:
WHEN CONSUMERS EXPERIENCE
ANTITRUST WELFARE LOSS
FROM EXCLUSIONARY
CONTRACTS BETWEEN HMO
INSURERS AND HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS
Andrew Ruskin*
I. INTRODUCTION ........................ 393
II. INJURY TO CONSUMERS THROUGH THE RAISING
OF RIVALS' COSTS: ECONOMIC THEORY ... 396
III. INJURY TO CONSUMERS THROUGH THE RAISING
OF RIVALS' COSTS: LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 401
A. Statutory and Case Law ................. 401
B. Regulatory Law ..................... 410
IV. INFERRING INJURY TO CONSUMERS THROUGH
THE RAISING OF RIVALS' COSTS IN THE HEALTH
CARE SETTING ........................ 415
A. Determining Consumer Demand ........... 416
1. Product Market Definition ............ 416
a. The Insurer Market ............. 416
b. The Provider Market ............ 421
2. Geographic Market Definition ......... 422
a. The HMO Market .............. 422
b. The Provider Market ............ 423
* The author graduated from Wesleyan University (B.A.) in Middletown, CT before
attending Case Western Reserve University School of Law. He is presently an associate in the
Health Care/Not-for-Profit Group of Cadwalader, Wickerham & Taft in New York.
HEALTH MATRIX
B. Evaluating the Degree to Which the Exclusionary
Restraint Raises Rivals' Costs ............ 424
1. Dangerous Concentration ............ 425
a. The HMO Market .............. 425
b. The Provider Market ............ 426
2. The Length of the Term of the Agreement 429
3. Rigidity of the Restraint ............. 430
4. The Amount of Pressure the Dealer
Places on the Supplier .............. 430
5. Intent of Management ............... 431
6. Size of Firms ..................... 431
7. Nature of Purchasers ............... 432
C. Determining the Ability of the Industry to
Increase Output in Response to Artificial
Scarcity ............................ 433
1. The Degree of Necessary Investment .... 433
2. The Minimum Efficient Scale of Operations 434
3. Regulatory Environment ............. 436
4. Capacity ........................ 439
5. Nature of Competitors .............. 439
D. Actual Effect on Output and Consumer Choice 441
E. Evaluation of Legal Precedent Examining the
Raising of Rival HMO Costs Through Exclusionary
Restraints ........................... 442
V. INJURY TO CONSUMERS THROUGH CONTROL
OVER PROVIDERS' OUTPUT: ECONOMIC
THEORY .............................. 444
VI. INJURY TO CONSUMERS THROUGH CONTROL
OF PROVIDERS' OUTPUT: LEGAL
DEVELOPMENT ........................ 451
VII. INFERRING INJURY TO CONSUMERS THROUGH
CONTROL OF PROVIDERS' OUTPUT IN THE
HEALTH CARE SETTING ................ 460
A. HMO Consumption of the Providers' Services . 461
B. Foreclosure of the Patient Market .......... 463
C. Barriers to Entry ...................... 464
D. Conduct ............................ 465
E. Performance ......................... 466
F. Evaluation of Legal Precedent Examining Monopsony
Through Exclusionary Restraints ........... 467
392 [Vol. 6:391
UNBRIDLED MANAGED CARE
VIII. CONCLUSION ......................... 468
I. INTRODUCTION
ALTHOUGH THE NATION has ignored rising health
care costs for decades, the public has felt the effects of these
increases so sharply in recent years that it has begun to clamor
for change within the industry. Between 1960 and 1993, the
cost of health care rose an average of 11.2 percent per year as
compared to the 4.7 percent per year rate for general infla-
tion.1 As a result of this dramatic increase, employers who
provide health coverage have limited pay increases to continue
to provide health benefits,2 shifted some of the financial bur-
den for health care onto the employees,3 or abandoned their
health benefit policies altogether.4 American households have
been forced to pick up some of the resulting burden, and thus,
many have purchased fewer other goods to maintain their
health care insurance.5 For many people without disposable
income or for whom private insurance is not possible, the only
choice is to forgo insurance.6 Consequently, cost increases
have led to increasingly harsh repercussions for much of the
American public.
As employers and consumers become increasingly affected
by the rising costs of health care, they are switching from tra-
ditional inefficient health plans to new health care financing
schemes which potentially lower overall costs. Traditionally,
the major form of private health insurance has been the fee-for-
service plan (FFS), typified by Blue Cross and Blue Shield
(BC/BS). These plans usually do not restrict the patient's
choice of provider,7 and they usually pay the provider based
1. PROsPEcrIvE PAYMENT COMM'N [HERmNAFT R PROPAC], MEDICARE AND THE
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 14 (1994).
2. Id. at 19.
3. Id. at 81. Employees are increasingly paying greater amounts in copayments and
deductibles for their health care.
4. Id at 17.
5. lId at 19. Although the average household spent only 4.3% of its aggregate personal
income in 1965 on health care, it spent 5.1% in 1991. Id. at 18.
6. Id. at 17. The number of uninsureds has grown from 10.8% of the population in 1980 to
14.7% of the population in 1993. Id.
7. HENRY BERmAN & LOUISA ROSE, CHOOSING THE RIGHT HEALTH CARE PLAN 18
(1990).
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on his costs or charges, regardless of the expense! Thus, the
physician has an incentive to perform unnecessary services,
and the industry has an incentive to compete in quality of
services as opposed to price.9 This form of payment has been
one of the major contributors to inflation within the health care
industry.
In response to the demand for lower prices, some insurers
have established health maintenance organizations (HMO).
Though there are some important differences among the forms
that HMOs employ, all HMOs involve prepayment for health
care services with a limited choice of participating provid-
ers."0 In the staff model HMO, doctors are employees of the
HMO and work on a salaried basis. The HMO usually owns or
controls the facilities where its doctors work." This integrated
provider-insurer unit must bear the financial risk of providing
services at the contracted rate. In the group model, the HMO
contracts with independent physician groups who agree to a
capitated payment basis for their services. 2 Thus, the doctors
are accepting much of the financial risk for their patients' care.
The individual practice association (IPA) model consists of
independent physicians who organize to contract with the
HMO to provide services either at a capitated rate or at a dis-
counted fee-for-service rate. 3 Though some of these physi-
cians might avoid financial risk through fee-for-service pay-
ment systems, many IPA HMOs withhold a certain amount
from the physician payments and return this portion in the
form of periodic bonuses contingent upon maintaining low
patterns of service use. 4 Hence, some financial risk is still
borne by the providers. Unlike the traditional model where
8. See id. at 23 (describing the system of paying physicians based on either their usual,
customary, or reasonable fees).
9. PROPAC, supra note 1, at 20.
10. James P. Freiburg, The ABCs of MCOs: An Overview of Managed Care Organizations,
81 ILL. B.J. 584,585 (1993).
11. Id.at586.
12. Id. (defiming capitation as the method of payment whereby the provider receives a fixed
sum for his services per pay period per person, regardless of the actual costs incurred).
13. Id.
14. BERMAN & ROSE, supra note 7, at 123.
15. The forms of liMOs discussed here represent only some of the many different types of
integrated delivery systems (IDS) that seem to be proliferating rapidly. For a more complete
survey, see Carl H. Hitchner et al., Integrated Delivery Systems: A Survey of Organizational
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the FFS insurer passes any cost increases back to the enrollees
in the form of higher rates, HMO insurers and providers are
assuming a large part of the financial risk, which leads them to
attempt to lower the costs of care.
In an increasingly competitive health care financing mar-
ket where unique forms of vertical integration and shifting of
financial risk are occurring, exclusionary contracts between in-
surers and providers actually can deprive consumers of the
benefits of the lower costs achieved through these networks. 6
For example, when accepting a group of providers into its
network, an HMO might try to forbid the providers from en-
tering into any other network for the length of the contract. If
the providers agree, the HMO comers a segment of the supply
market. This artificial scarcity would lead to higher costs for
rival networks and higher market prices for health care. Simi-
larly, the lack of sufficient resources would prevent the rival
networks from expanding to their full potential. The successful
HMO thus could extract economic rents 7 by raising its prices
to a higher than perfectly competitive rate. This price increase
would result in injury to consumers because they would experi-
ence higher-than-optimal prices and lower-than-optimal HMO
enrollment options. In addition to distorting the market by
raising rivals' costs, the HMO in this exclusionary relationship
also might exploit its strengthened bargaining power relative to
the providers by reducing price and the level of service they
provide enrollees. Ultimately, this would result in injury to the
consumers who would prefer more services in an ideally com-
petitive environment. Therefore, the HMO that successfully
imposes an exclusionary restraint on a group of providers can
cause twofold injury to consumers by raising rivals' costs and
restraining providers' output.
This Note addresses both of these types of injuries and the
Models, 29 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 273 (1994) (illustrating many types of new combinations of
physicians, hospitals, and insurers).
16. See John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy and Health Care Reform, ANTrrRusT BULL., Spring
1994, at 59, 101 (asserting that future growth in the HMO industry likely will breed an increasing
number of cases where exclusive dealings will have caused antitrust injuries).
17. Economic rents are profits that a firm receives in excess of its costs, including its
opportunity costs. ROGER L. MILLER & ROGER E. MEIERS, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS
332 (1986).
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mechanisms through which they can be perpetrated. It then de-
scribes the factors that courts consider in recognizing the likeli-
hood of each of these injuries occurring. Focusing on the in-
correct assumptions about the health care industry relied upon
by the first circuit court in U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v.
Healthsource, Inc.,8 and the seventh circuit court in Blue
Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v. Marshfield Clin-
ic,9 this Note suggests guidelines for interpreting the antitrust
injury arising out of exclusionary relationships in a manner that
better accords with the economic realities of health care.
II. INJURY TO CONSUMERS THROUGH THE
RAISING OF RIVALS' COSTS: ECONOMIC THEORY
One of the primary goals of economic theory is the exami-
nation of efficiency. Efficiency within a competitive market
consists of the maximization of the sum of both consumer
welfare and producer profit.' Maximum efficiency within the
health care industry requires that purchasers bid upon health
care services until the price of the services equals their perfect-
ly competitive rate.2" However, it is possible that an HMO
would insist upon an exclusionary contract preventing a health
care provider from offering its services to other HMOs. By
removing potential services from its rivals, the HMO would
make them bid up the price of the services of the remaining
providers, consequently raising their costs to an above optimal
level.' Figure one illustrates this phenomenon as a shift of S
to S', which shifts p* to p'. Here S represents the supply of
18. 986 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1993). As described infra, notes 59-74 and accompanying text,
this court examined the anticompetitive effects of an exclusionary relationship between an HMO
and its providers.
19. 65F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1288 (1996).
20. Terry Calvani, What is the Objective ofAntitrust?, in ECONOMIC ANALYSiS AND ANTI-
TRUST LAW 7, 12 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds., 2d ed. 1988) (describing the factors of
economic efficiency).
21. See Mu.LER & MEINERS, supra note 17, at 36-38 (describing the way buyers and sellers
adjust the market through exchange to bring it to an equilibrium price).
22. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, in 2 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANITRUST LAW 231,
237 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds., 1988). These costs of the rival HMOs are higher than
optimal because the anticompetitive HMO has created an artificial scarcity by restraining the sale
of services that the provider has the potential to produce above the needs of the anticompetitive
HMO. Krattenmaker and Salop refer to this as "real foreclosure." Id.
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health care services available to rival HMOs in a state of per-
fect competition, and S' represents the supply of these services
as a result of foreclosure. In this way, the HMO would have a
competitive advantage over its rivals.
An HMO will impose this sort of agreement upon provid-
ers when the incremental increase in average cost it expects to
incur due to the agreement is less than it expects to make in
increased prices from its premiums.' As illustrated in Figure
two, the impact of the exclusionary dealing on the price of
premiums depends upon its effect on the supply curve of rival
HMOs and on the enrollee demand curve.24
23. See Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffnan, Recent Advances in the Theory of
Industrial Structure, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 267,269 (1983) (discussing the relationship between the
demand curve and average cost curve in an industry burdened with an exclusionary relationship).
The change in average cost (ac) is depicted in figure two. The HMO follows this rationale because
it calculates its profits as pq-(ac)q where p is a product's price, q is the quantity, and ac is the
average cost of inputs. If ac rises less than p at a given q, then the overall profit increases. The
demand curve equals the premium price enrollees are willing to pay for health care services at a
given supply, and thus a shift up the demand curve is equivalent to a shift up of the price of
premiums. See MnI.ER & MEINERS, supra note 17, at 25 (defining the market demand curve).
24. The supply curve also can be thought of as the rival firms' marginal cost curve. Salop
3971996]
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Aac
q* q
rival firms anticompetitive
firm
Before it can be assured of the success of its exclusionary deal-
ing, the anticompetitive HMO needs to understand the degree
of the resulting shift of the rival HMOs' supply curve as well
as the elasticity of both the rival HMOs' supply curve and the
consumer demand curve.' Seeking maximum profitability, an
HIMO will impose an exclusionary restraint when it believes
that: i) it will succeed initially in raising its rivals' costs; ii) its
rivals will not be able to respond to any resulting industry
shortage through increased production; and, iii) consumers still
will enroll in the HMO that is imposing the exclusionary re-
straint despite an increase in the price of premiums.26 When
& Scheffman, supra note 23, at 268. Thus a shift in this curve entails a change in the rival finns'
cost structure.
25. Id. at 269 (defining elasticity as the degree to which the changes in price of a good
affect the quantity that is bought or sold). See also GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE
326-29 (1966) (defining elasticity as a frame of reference within which the prices of two disparate
products can be compared).
26. Salop & Scheffinan, supra note 23, at 269. The authors state that a successful
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these conditions are met, there is a strong incentive to engage
in exclusionary behavior.
In addition to the anticompetitive gains attained from rais-
ing rivals' costs, both the HMO and the providers realize pro-
duction cost savings through the exclusionary arrangement. The
providers avoid transaction costs incurred from negotiating
multiple HMO contracts and from administering multiple
plans." The IMO also benefits because assurance of its pro-
vider base decreases costs in finding sufficient capacity for its
enrollees and increases its bargaining power with employers
contemplating entry into the plan.' As a team, both parties
can engage in more effective planning. Because of consistency
in enrollment, the provider can better predict the needs of its
patients and can develop capacity appropriately.29 Through its
exclusionary relationship must fulfill three conditions: i) the rival firms' supply curve must
experience a great shift upwards; ii) the rival firms' supply curve also must be highly inelastic;
and, iii) the consumer demand curve must be inelastic at the anticompetitive firm's price range. Id.
By way of example of the IMO's successful implementation of its exclusionary re-
lationship, an HMO likely would prohibit specialists and specialty facilities, such as cardiologists
and cardiology clinics, from providing services to other HMOs if it could do so cheaply. Since
there is usually only a limited supply of cardiologists in a given area, the cardiologists not under
the restraint would have increased bargaining power. Thus they would be able to charge above
optimal rates for their services to rival HMOs who would experience increased costs.
Consequently, the rival HMOs would likely increase their enrollment prices to cover their costs.
The anticompetitive HMO also would cause a decrease in the production of rival HMOs through
its exclusionary restraint because there would be fewer cardiologists available to service HMO
customers. Hence there would result a decrease in the number of consumers who could enroll in
rival HMO plans and receive adequate treatment. The rival HMOs would likely not try to
compensate for this scarcity of cardiologists by bringing them in from other areas because they
would need to expend tremendous resources either to induce new cardiologists into the area or to
build new facilities. Rather, they would need to limit the number of enrollees allowed to join to
prevent exceeding present capacity, which would further cause the price to rise to accommodate
the scarce supply. If enrollees believe that the value of HMO enrollment exceeds this
anticompetitive price, consumers consequently would pay more for their HMO enrollment
subsequent to this increase in the market price and decrease in the market output. This signifies
that the anticompetitive HMO could charge more for its services without any change in its
product The HMO will decide whether to engage in this action based upon whether it can earn
more from the increased prices of its enrollment fees than it pays out to get the exclusionary
restraint.
27. See Julie Johnsson, Magic Carpet Ride? An Exclusive Provider Deal May Seem En-
chanted- Until the Insurer Pulls the Rug Out, AM. MED. NEWs, June 13, 1994, at 23 (pointing
out why Austin Regional Clinic providers originally were willing to enter into an exclusionary
contract with PruCare that later turned out to be problematic).
28. Id. See also Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 22, at 232 (pointing out that a dealer
incurs lower transaction costs in acquiring its inputs by being assured of its supply).
29. See Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints Among Hospitals, Physicians and Health
Insurers that Raise Rivals' Costs, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 147, 160 n.46 (1988) (discussing
integration within the health care setting).
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ability to share information with providers and to coordinate
programs with them, the HMO can plan more effective promo-
tions of the providers' services." Thus, savings accrue to the
parties in the agreement that might be passed on to the con-
sumers.
Even if these savings initially benefit the consumers, it is
likely that this arrangement eventually would cause them inju-
ry. Due to the long-term decline of competition in the market,
the anticompetitive HMO would have the incentive eventually
to raise prices above their optimal level, which would result in
allocative inefficiency." An allocative distortion also arises
from depriving rival HMOs and their enrollees of sufficient
health care resources to handle the demand for HMO services.
Not only does the scarcity of resources artificially restrain
output of HMO services, it also creates production inefficiency
in the form of increased costs of producing the output of HMO
services.3" The anticompetitive IMO might create additional
production inefficiency by engaging in further strategic behav-
ior to increase its position relative to its competitors.33 This
expense, like the expense incurred by imposing the
exclusionary restraint, adds costs without benefit to the con-
sumer. Moreover, competitors would face barriers to acquiring
market share, and due to uncertain payoffs, would be deterred
30. See, e.g., BERMAN & ROSE, supra note 7, at 60 (describing the way the group practice
model fosters cooperation between the HMO and providers in setting up educational classes and
support groups for enrollees).
31. See Frances H. Miller, Vertical Restraints and Powerful Health Insurers: Exclusionary
Conduct Masquerading as Managed Care?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1988, at 195,218
(discussing the ramifications of Blue Cross and Blue Shield entering into the managed care arena).
Allocative efficiency comes from the allocation of outputs through the pricing system to
the consumers who place the highest value on them. Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of
Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020,
1027 (1987).
32. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 22, at 244 (suggesting that exclusionary rela-
tionships increase production inefficiency). Brodley defines production efficiency as the
production of goods at the least cost in the present state of technology. Brodley, supra note 31, at
1027.
33. See Richard A. Posner, The Economic Theory of Monopoly and the Case for Antitrust,
in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW 231,232 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds., 2d
ed. 1988) (explaining that firms are attracted to monopoly profits and will expend resources in
attaining them). For instance, it might engage in heavy advertising to counteract the effects of its
new supracompetitive pricing. In general HMOs already exhibit this tendency to increase
production costs through advertising. See Rebecca Kuzins, HMOs Get More Profits, More Critics,
Bus J. SERVING GREATER SACRAMENTO, Jan. 9, 1995, at 1, 29 (discussing the enormous amount
of HMO income spent on non-health care related items such as advertising).
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from investing in technological developments in health care
management. Thus, there is little likelihood of increased inno-
vation efficiency within such a system.34 Due to these exten-
sive inefficiencies, any short term gains for consumers would
be more than offset by long term consumer welfare loss in
situations where the HMO succeeds in imposing costs on its ri-
vals.
III. INJURY TO CONSUMERS THROUGH THE
RAISING OF RIVALS' COSTS: LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Statutory and Case Law
The Sherman Act, one of the primary manifestations of
congressional concern about anticompetitive behavior, renders
illegal any "contract, combination... , or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade,"'35 as well as the act of any person that "shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize."36 Though the underly-
ing objective of the Act has been the subject of much de-
bate, 7 economic efficiency has been the most often cited rea-
son for its enactment.3" Some scholars temper this goal with a
need to assure that consumers receive an appropriate share of
the wealth created by efficiency. 9 Economic models are one
tool courts use to determine antitrust injury, due to the intrinsi-
cally economic nature of this cause of action." Economic
models illustrate the conditions that need to be fulfilled before
an antitrust injury occurs. The legal system has developed
criteria that resemble the factors examined by economists in
34. Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,427 (2d Cir. 1945) (asserting
that the fairness of Alcoa's profits did not justify its monopoly power because rivals, if allowed in
the market, could discover innovative techniques that would enhance production, lower costs, and
cut prices). See also Brodley, supra note 31, at 1044 (noting that exclusionary contracts promote
inefficiency). Innovation inefficiency refers to the invention, development, and implementation of
new technology. Id. at 1025-26. Brodley asserts that innovative inefficiency and production
inefficiency are more injurious than allocative inefficiency because they are more likely to impede
increases in long-term social wealth. Id. at 1027.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
37. Calvani, supra note 20, at 7.
38. Id. at 12.
39. Brodley, supra note 31, at 1023.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 n.41 (1963)
(relying on the analysis of various economists in determining the threshold post-merger market
share of a firm that would pose an anticompetitive threat to an industry).
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the context of exclusionary vertical restraints that impose costs
on rivals.
The Supreme Court first set out principles for examining
exclusionary vertical relationships in Standard Oil Co. v. Unit-
ed States (Standard Stations).41 In this case, the Court consid-
ered the anticompetitive effects of a contract in which Standard
Oil imposed exclusive dealing arrangements upon independent
stations that forbade them from selling competing products.42
The Court found that in foreclosing a substantial share of the
market, Standard Oil had engaged in anticompetitive behav-
ior.43 Although it acknowledged that there had been no evi-
dence of any decline in competitive activity within the market,
the Court found that market share alone created sufficient dan-
ger to warrant Standard Oil's removal.' Thus, the Court indi-
cated that it need only consider the size of the anticompetitive
firm in finding an antitrust violation stemming from an
exclusionary vertical restraint.
The somewhat narrow approach of Standard Stations was
expanded in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.45 Tam-
pa Electric received a guarantee from Nashville Coal that it
would supply all the coal needed by Tampa Electric's generat-
ing plants for a period of twenty years.' In evaluating the
anticompetitive effects of an exclusive dealing arrangement, the
Court followed a three-step process: first, define the product
market;47 second, delineate the geographic market in which
41. 337 U.S. 293 (1949). The Court examines this case in the context of a Clayton § 3
violation. Id. Since Clayton § 3 applies only to commodities, health care services cannot be
considered under this cause of action. Cf., e.g., Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. United Press Int'l,
Inc., 369 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1966) (finding that a radio broadcast is not a commodity for the
purposes of a Clayton § 3 analysis). However, other courts have followed the reasoning of
Standard Stations, even within the health care service context. See, e.g., U. S. Healthcare, Inc. v.
Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 595 (1st Cir. 1993).
42. Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 295-96. Though this case is one in which the manu-
facturer imposed an exclusionary restraint upon the dealer, it illustrates how the Court deals with
these types of restraints overall.
43. Id. at 314. The Court based its conclusion of substantial market share on its findings
expressed earlier in the opinion that the independent service stations accounted for 6.7% of the
relevant market. Id. at 295.
44. Id. at314.
45. 365 U.S. 320 (1961). Similar to Standard Stations, this case also appears as a Clayton
§ 3 violation. Id. at 321.
46. Id. at 322.
47. Id. at 327.
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the products compete;' and third, find a substantial share of
this market affected by the restraint.49 After reiterating the
need for the quantitative information upon which the Standard
Stations Court relied to determine substantial foreclosure within
a market, the Court listed various qualitative factors to consider
before finding an anticompetitive effect." These include "the
relative strength of the parties, the proportionate volume of
commerce involved in relation to the total volume of com-
merce in the relevant market area, and the probable immediate
and future effects which preemption of that share of the market
might have on effective competition therein."51  Weighing
these factors, the Court did not find any substantial foreclosure
within the market. 2 Through this balancing process, the Court
established criteria that more closely determine the actual com-
petitiveness of an industry.
The analysis of exclusionary vertical restraints was refined
further in Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde.53 A
hospital had entered into a contract with a finn of anesthesiolo-
gists agreeing to use only that firm's services for its anesthe-
siology needs.54 Although the majority analyzed this case as a
tying arrangement, 5 Justice O'Connor viewed it as an exclu-
sive dealing relationship. 6 Concurring with the majority that
no restraint of trade had occurred in this case, 7 she stated
48. Id. (quoting a footnote in Standard Stations that alluded to the possibility that the
national market might not be the appropriate market to examine in all cases). By requiring the
examination of the product and geographic market, the Court compels an analysis of the elasticity
of the consumer demand curve, i.e., the range of substitutes for the product under the restraint.
This step accords with the economic model's description of the circumstances which could lead to
foreclosure. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (giving an economic analysis of the
necessary criteria involved in imposing a successful exclusionary restraint).
49. Tampa Electric, 365 U.S. at 328.
50. Id. at 328-29.
51. Id. at 329. This consideration of the power of different firms within the industry helps
indicate the degree to which an anticompetitive firm successfully can raise its rivals' costs through
the imposition of an exclusionary restraint on a substantial amount of input. This condition must
be met before the economic model would predict the existence of an antitrust injury. See supra
notes 23-26 and accompanying text (discussing several economic criteria that indicate
foreclosure).
52. Tampa Electric, 365 U.S. at 335.
53. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id. at 4, 7-32 (discussing the resulting "tying" of certain anesthesiology services with
use of the hospital's operating room).
56. Id. at 33.
57. Id. at 46.
19961
HEALTH MATRIX
several factors to consider before finding an exclusionary
agreement unreasonable. She clarified that "the proper focus is
on the structure of the market for the products or services in
question - the number of sellers and buyers in the market, the
volume of their business, and the ease with which buyers and
sellers can redirect their purchases or sales to others.""8 The
increase in the number of factors to be considered represents a
greater potential for accuracy in understanding the interplay be-
tween the economic paradigm and actual contingencies within
the market.
Although there is no Supreme Court case that deals with
exclusionary vertical restraints between HMOs and providers,
the First Circuit addressed this scenario in U.S. Healthcare,
Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc.59 The defendant HMO entered into
contracts with doctors under which the physicians would re-
ceive a higher rate of capitation if they agreed not to provide
services to any other HMOs.' When the plaintiff HMO had
great difficulty in getting doctors to participate in its plan, it
filed suit based on violations of the Sherman Act sections 1
and 2.61 After dismissing the plaintiff's claim of a section 1
per se violation,62 the court examined the defendant's behavior
under the rule of reason test as delineated in Tampa Electric to
determine the degree to which it had led to foreclosure in the
provider market.' The court found itself severely limited in
58. Id. at 45. By recommending that courts examine whether rivals can compensate for the
exclusionary restraint by finding new suppliers, Justice O'Connor leads the courts to consider the
supply curve elasticity. Firms without access to supplies have inelastic supply curves because they
cannot respond to the increases in price through increases in production. This condition is a
necessary precursor for the successful imposition of an exclusionary restraint. See supra notes 23-
26 and accompanying text (listing some important factors for finding an antitrust injury in an
exclusionary relationship).
59. 986 F.2d 589 (lst Cir. 1993).
60. Id. at 592. The doctors would still be allowed to serve patients under traditional
indemnity policies or under preferred provider organization (PPO) arrangements. Id.
61. Id.at593.
62. Id. at 593-94. The plaintiff tried to characterize the arrangement as a group boycott in
which the doctors would be determined to have entered into a horizontal agreement in restraint of
trade. Id. This kind of boycott would be treated as a per se violation of the Sherman Act and
would mean that the defendant was liable regardless of the actual degree of anticompetitive
effects. Id. at 593.
63. Id. at 595. The rule of reason test implies that the court considers all the potential
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects to determine if there has been an unreasonable
restraint of trade. Id. In addition to an unreasonable restraint of trade, courts usually must find
market power, injury, and agreement to establish a Sherman § 1 violation. See, e.g., Blue Cross &
[Vol. 6:391
UNBRIDLED MANAGED CARE
its ability to consider the issues thoroughly because the plain-
tiff failed to frame its case in a traditional antitrust form.6
Thus, it did not address the relevant product market or the
relevant geographic market as required under Tampa Elec-
tric.65 Instead, it began by examining the anticompetitive ten-
dencies of the agreement. First, it found no evidence that the
doctors were restrained by the agreement because many of
them easily might be persuaded to leave the HMO.' Second,
the court found that the thirty day notice requirement before
terminating the exclusive agreement was de minimis and thus
no hindrance to trade.67 Third, the court found no evidence
that the defendant HMO had blocked off a significant part of
the supply market, as new doctors are always coming into the
market.' Thus, the court found ample grounds for dismissing
the section 1 claim.
Though the court did not consider the HMO agreement a
violation of Sherman section 1, it investigated the relationship
as a potential monopolization violation of Sherman section
2.69 The court began its investigation of monopoly power by
considering the product market definition, but qualified its ap-
proach by defiming the relevant market as the health care con-
sumer market and not the supply market of doctors.70 It based
this conclusion on the belief that there could never be monop-
sonistic buying power over doctors because they have many
potential buyers of their services.71 The court decided that the
appropriate question was whether the product market consisted
of HMOs or of health care financing in general.72 Although
Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, Memorandum & Order, (94-C-137-S) (W.D. Wis. Oct. 28,
1994) (finding sufficient evidence of these elements to deny defendants summary judgment).
64. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589,595 (lst Cir. 1993).
65. However, it found an opportunity to consider these factors later in the opinion when
dealing with the Sherman § 2 violation claim. Id. at 598-99 (discussing how to define a product
market involving HMO services).
66. Id. at 595-96.
67. Id. at 596.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 597. For Sherman § 2, the plaintiff must prove monopoly power and unlawful
conduct aimed at maintaining monopoly power. See infra note 281 and accompanying text
(discussing this cause of action within the context of monopsonistic power over providers).
70. U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 598.
71. Id. Monopsony is the converse of monopoly power whereby there is only one buyer
within a market. See infra part V (discussing the mechanics of a monopsonistic relationship).
72. U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 598.
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the plaintiff argued that the HMO market should be the rele-
vant product market, the court determined that mere differences
in price and quality did not constitute a lack of substitutability
between HMO insurance and other insurance mechanisms.'
Since there were too many available insurers to allow the de-
fendant to gain market control, the court found it unnecessary
to consider whether the lower court had properly determined
that the relevant geographic market should be the entire state
of New Hampshire, as opposed to the plaintiff's claim that it
should be only southern New Hampshire.74 The court conclud-
ed that no monopolization of the consumer market had taken
place.75 Though this case was decided at the circuit court lev-
el, it stands out as one of the few cases dealing with exclusion-
ary relationships within managed care. Thus it likely will be
influential in future similar cases.
73. Id. at 598-99. In finding substitutability between these two types of health insurance,
the court assumed that consumers are roughly ambivalent about signing up for HMO-type
insurance with its peculiar features at its ordinary cost or for FFS insurance with its peculiar
features at its ordinary cost. Thus a small increase in the price of one of these financing
mechanisms would lead to a corresponding decrease in its enrollment as consumers switch to the
other financing mechanism. This interaction between products is called cross-elasticity. See
PHILIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 576 (1988)
(defining cross-elasticity as "the rate at which consumers change their consumption of one
product in response to a price change for another").
While the court refers to cross-elasticity only in general terms, Areeda and Kaplow point
out the need to define properly what price is going to be used as the baseline when determining
consumer reaction to price. Id. at 571. If the potentially anticompetitive firm already is charging
prices well in excess of its costs, then it already has market power, regardless of whether a slight
increase in price would cause consumers to switch to another product. Id. Thus cross-elasticity
should be determined in relation to the product's competitive price, which is approximately equal
to its cost, including the producer's opportunity cost. Id. See also Posner's interpretation of the du
Pont case in RICHARD A. POSNER, ANITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 127-28 (1976)
("[A]t a high enough price even poor substitutes look good to the consumer .... Reasonable
interchangeability at the current price level.., far from demonstrating absence of monopoly
power, might well be a symptom of that power .. ."). Ironically, Posner did not follow this
reasoning in looking at the high rate of return demonstrated by the Marshfield Clinic in his
Marshfield opinion. Infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
Though this court determined that HMO and FFS insurance are interchangeable, studies
in the area do not point to this result. See infra part IV.A.l.a. The court did make the disclaimer
that because the plaintiff had not argued this point well, it did not have sufficient evidence to de-
termine fully the true extent of substitutability of the two products. U.S. Healthcare Inc., 986 F.2d
589, 599 (1st Cir. 1993). Since the development of the HMO submarket has only recently become
salient, several other courts also have failed to recognize it. See, e.g., Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v.
Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1331-32 (7th Cir. 1986) and Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1478-79 (D. Kan. 1987), affid in part and remanded in part, 899 F.2d
951 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990) (refusing to find an HMO submarket).
74. U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 599.
75. Id.
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Another case that courts will probably turn to in examin-
ing exclusionary relationships between HMOs and providers is
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic.76 In this case,
the defendant clinic-owned by the 400 physicians it em-
ployed-established a subsidiary HMO that was highly suc-
cessful in the fourteen rural Wisconsin counties where it oper-
ated.' After BC/BS's subsidiary HMO found itself excluded
from this market, it filed suit alleging Sherman section 2 viola-
tions." Initially successful at the district court level, the plain-
tiffs lost on appeal to the Seventh Circuit.79
Although the court had several grounds for its reversal, it
relied primarily on its finding inadequate evidence of an HMO
submarket in the trial court's record. 0 The court described
HMOs as merely a "method of pricing medical services.""
Looking at the array of substitutes available to buyers of health
care services, the court asserted that the trial record showed
ample evidence of IMO competition with both FFS and PPO
type plans. 2 The court added that many people do not like the
incentives to reduce services within HMOs, and therefore they
likely would change plans with an increase in HMO premiu-
ms.83 From the sellers' side, the court said that an increase in
prices for HMO services above their competitive level would
attract physicians to HMOs to capture some of the wealth.84
76. 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996).
77. Id. at 1408-09. In nine of the 14 counties in which it operated, the HMO enrolled over
90% of all HMO enrollees. Id. at 1409.
78. Id. at 1408. BC/BS alleged separate Sherman § 1 violations in its own name as well;
however, the court said that since the physicians and the Clinic were part of the same entity, the
single fin could not collude with itself. Id. at 1415.
79. 1& at 1416. The judgment also was affirmed in part. Id. However, that segment of the
case is not relevant to this Note.
80. Id. at 1411.
81. Id. at 1409. In so finding, the court disagreed with the findings of unique characteristics
of HMOs made by the lower court, such as primary care physicians with gatekeeping functions,
monitored use of health care resources, and extensive preventive care programs. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, 883 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 (W.D. Wis. 1995), affd in part, rev'd
in part and remanded, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996).
82. Id. at 1410. The term PPO refers to preferred provider organizations, a type of
financing mechanism whereby the enrollee has a limited choice of physicians in return for lower
premiums, deductibles, and copayments. Freiburg, supra note 10, at 587.
83. Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1410. But see infra part IV.A.I.a (describing distinct consumer
preferences for either HMOs or FFS insurance for non-price reasons).
84. Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1410-11. The court, however, does not explain why physicians
would switch to the provision of HMO services merely because of an increase in HMO premiums.
The HMOs also would have to pay physicians more before their incentives to work for HMOs
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Without any finding of distinctive characteristics separating
HMOs from other financing mechanisms, the court accordingly
determined that HMOs did not constitute a submarket.
After investigating the nature of the product market, the
appellate court went on to look at the plaintiff's definition of
the geographic market accepted by the district court. The court
accepted the plaintiff's proposition that primary care is general-
ly local.' Hence in the one county where all the physicians
were employees of Marshfield's HMO, the court suggested that
it might accept the idea of exclusion of BC/BS.' However,
the magnitude of the compensation demanded showed that the
plaintiff asserted a much larger geographic region in which the
injury was perpetrated. 7 The plaintiffs tried to establish that
in the entire north central Wisconsin region, certain procedures
as defined by their DRGs were performed almost exclusively
by Marshfield physicians. 8 Yet the court decided that most
procedures could be performed by other physicians if one phy-
sician charged supracompetitive prices for them.89 In this way,
the court found that there was a substitutability of supply that
negated a finding of separate markets.' Thus even if HMOs
were a submarket, the degree of antitrust injury would have to
reflect only the harm incurred in the few local markets where
BC/BS was foreclosed from offering primary care services.
The court also examined the plaintiff's claim that direct
evidence of the Clinic's monopoly power could be found in the
high rate of return it achieved through its HMO product.91
Even if the high rate of return was not a result of mere ac-
counting conventions, the court pointed out that superior effi-
would increase. Yet HMOs often prefer to increase their profit margins rather than pay more for
services. See infra note 251 and accompanying text (discussing the tendency among HMOs to
increase profits by decreasing medical loss ratios).
85. Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1411.
86. Id.
87. Id. The judgment awarded BCBS at the trial court level was just under $20 million. lad
at 1408.
88. Id. at 1411.
89. Id.
90. Id. Although the court found supply elasticity, it did not discuss the potential for DRGs
to act as proxies for non-interchangeable specialized services. See infra Part IV.A.l.b and Part
IV.A.2.b (discussing the differences among primary, secondary, and tertiary care as well as their
varying geographic markets).
91. Marshfield, 65 F.3d, at 1411.
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ciency could lead to a high rate of return.92 Yet this efficiency
would not block out other competitors who were equally effi-
cient.93 Accordingly, the court did not accept evidence of a
high rate of return as evidence of monopoly power.
Even if the plaintiffs had proven monopoly power, the
court expressed its willingness to accept that Marshfield could
be a "natural monopolist" in the sparsely populated regions of
rural Wisconsin." The court believed that the market was too
small to support competitors.95 Although in some cases facili-
ties run by a natural monopolist are viewed as essential facili-
ties to which competitors must be given equal access,' the
court here found that Marshfield Clinic's resources were not
essential due to the lack of an HMO submarket.' Thus
BC/BS could not use the legal system to force Marshfield to
yield access to its resources.
Following this denial of Marshfield Clinic's status as a
monopolist, the court stated in dictum how it would treat
BC/BS's claims that the Marshfield Clinic unlawfully main-
tained its monopolistic position.9" BC/BS alleged various ac-
tivities on the part of Marshfield Clinic that made it difficult
for rival HMOs to enter, such as: refusing to allow its physi-
cians to cross-cover with physicians outside the network, dis-
couraging hospitals controlled by Marshfield doctors from
joining other HMOs, and restricting staff privileges for non-
92. Id. at 1412.
93. Id. But see supra note 73 & infra part IV.A.I.a (stating that a firm's rate of return must
be taken into consideration when judging if the present interchangeability between two products
actually might be a result of supracompetitive pricing).
94. Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1412.
95. Id. In its discussion of the need for a natural monopoly, the court inexplicably refers to
the harm imposed upon a community by making its limited number of doctors compete with each
other when they should be helping each other to bear the burden of the costs of expensive medical
equipment. Id. This case is not about trying to instill competition among the doctors; rather,
BC/BS tried to make the health care financing market more competitive by introducing its HMO
product. The court does not address competition at this tier of the health care industry. The court
again confuses these two tiers of the market when it says that HMO competition will not deprive
physicians of their monopolistic fees. Id. at 1413. Yet it does not consider whether HMO
supracompetitive profits would decrease as a result of competition.
96. Id. at 1412.
97. Id. at 1413. But see infra part IV.C.2 (arguing that once the HMO submarket has been
properly recognized, courts should use the essential facilities doctrine freely within exclusionary
relationship cases because of the ease with which one HMO can foreclose access to other HMOs
of specialty care in many American communities).
98. Marshfield, 65 F.3d, at 1413.
40919961
HEALTH MATRIX
Marshfield physicians at those hospitals." Yet the court found
legitimate business purposes for all of these activities.00
Therefore, regardless of Marshfield's position as a monopolist,
the court would not sustain a Sherman section 2 violation. This
court's holding adds great weight to the precedent set by the
U.S. Healthcare court.
B. Regulatory Law
In 1985, the Department of Justice (DOJ) codified en-
forcement policies in its Vertical Restraints Guidelines. 1' The
Guidelines have been overruled because of their emphasis on
theory over fact."° However, these Guidelines are useful be-
cause they delineate a systematic approach for understanding
non-price vertical restraints even though the DOJ no longer
abides by them. In section three, the Guidelines attempt to
prevent both collusion among competitors and the exclusion of
rivals from input sources that would raise their costs." 3 Hav-
ing acknowledged the potentially anticompetitive effects of ver-
tical restraints on a market, the Guidelines explain how to
evaluate whether the market has been adversely affected by
them.
As a precursor to its analysis, the Guidelines define the
market. Section 6.1 describes how to define the product mar-
ket." It begins by narrowly defining the product market and
then poses the question of what would happen if a "small but
significant and nontransitory" price shift took place. For
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1413-14. The court looked at the need for quality physicians as a legitimate
reason for limiting staff privileges, the reasonability of acting within one's own economic self-
interest as grounds for avoiding entering into multiple HMO contracts, and the inability of
Marshfield physicians to make time commitments to independent physicians as the reason for no
cross-coverage. Id.
101. Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6263 (1985).
102. Assistant Attorney General Anne K. Bingaman, Address to ABA's Antitrust Section, 65
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 967, at 251 (Aug. 12, 1993). Assistant Attorney General
Anne Bingaman further added that the DOJ will no longer be as inclined to find that the
procompetitive effects of these restraints dominate as the agency had done previously. Id. Thus
greater caution is now warranted by private industry.
103. Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. at 6267.
104. Id. at 6272. This is consistent with the first part of the test established by the Tampa
Electric court, discussed supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
105. Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. at 6272.
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example, if a large number of people would buy a substitute
and exclude any possibility of profitability to the potential
monopolist, then that product would be included in the product
market."°6 The Guidelines suggest looking at buyer and seller
perceptions about the interchangeability of the products as well
as the patterns of consumption and the behavior of price over
time. 7 These considerations apply to both levels of the re-
straint."'
In an analogous fashion, section 6.2 then defines the rele-
vant geographic market. 9 First, one looks at what would
happen if a "small but significant and nontransitory" price shift
took place."' If a large number of people would buy the
product at other locations and detract from the profitability to
the potential monopolist, then these other locations should be
included in the geographic region."' The Guidelines suggest
observing present shipment patterns, transportation costs, price
behavior, and the capacity of firms within a region12 This
procedure also applies to both levels of the restraint."3
Through the careful delineation of the product and geographic
markets at both the manufacturer and dealer levels, the Guide-
lines minimize any underinclusion or overinclusion that might
mask effects of inefficiency.
Having defined the market, the Guidelines then use a two-
step approach in evaluating its competitive nature. Under sec-
tion 4.1, market structure is the first aspect examined." 4 The
Guidelines examine the market structure by measuring both the
106. Id.
107. Id. at 6272 n.36 (referring the reader to the 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg.
26,823, 26,828 § 2.1 for information about how the product market should be defined).
108. id. at 6272.
109. Id. This accords with the second part of the test established by the Tampa Electric
court, discussed supra note 48 and accompanying text. Together with the product market
definition, this factor also illustrates the determinants of the elasticity of the consumer demand
curve. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (describing the crucial role of the demand
curve in the development of the economic model of exclusionary restraints).
110. Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. at 6272.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 6272 n.37 (referring the reader to the 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg.
26,823, 26,829 § 2.3 for information about how the geographic market is defined). The term
"shipment patterns" refers to the patterns of movement of buyers, sellers, and goods and services
in the course of transactions.
113. Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. at 6272.
114. Id. at 6268.
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vertical restraints index (VRI)" 5 and the coverage ratio. 6
Within certain limits, the Guidelines do not consider a market
to be dangerously anticompetitive;" 7 however, they suggest
further investigation outside these limits.
If there is a potential for anticompetitive effects within a
vertical restraint, the Guidelines delineate a rule of reason anal-
ysis where they consider conditions that might make
anticompetitive behavior more or less likely. Primarily, they
are concerned with ease of entry.' If exclusion of rivals is
115. Id. The VRI is calculated by first identifying which firms employ vertical restraints. Id.
at 6268 n.25. Second, their market shares are determined. Id. Then each of their market shares are
squared and added together. Id. For example, if in a given market, only two dealers employ a re-
straint, one with a 5% and one with a 20% market share, the dealer market VRI would equal 52
202 - 25 400 - 425. Id. If four suppliers, each with a 25% market share, are involved in the
restraint, then the supplier market VRI would equal 4(252) - 4(625) - 2,500. Id. Thus in this
market, there would be a dealer VRI of 425 and a supplier VRI of 2,500. Id. The maximum VRI
would come from one firm controlling all of one of the markets, which would result in a VRI of
10,000 for that market. Id. This attention to both the number of sellers and their respective market
shares is consistent with the concurring opinion in Jefferson Parish, discussed supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
116. Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. at 6268. The coverage ratio refers to the
sum of all the market shares of the firms participating in vertical restraints at one level. Id. at 6268
n.26. Thus, in a supplier market with 10 suppliers under a vertical restraint, each having five
percent of the market, the coverage ratio would equal 10(5) - 50%. Id. Between the VRI and the
coverage ratio, one can understand more clearly whether real foreclosure has occurred that likely
will raise rivals' costs. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (discussing the raising of
rivals' costs as a necessary element of a successful exclusionary restraint).
117. Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. at 6268. When the Guidelines were in
force, the DOJ would not have challenged a restraint if it resulted in: 1) 10% or less of the market
share in the relevant market for the firm employing the restraint; 2) a VRI under 1200 and a
coverage ratio below 60% in the same relevant market; 3) a VRI below 1200 in both markets; or,
4) a coverage ratio below 60% in both markets. Id.
As with the product market definition and the geographic market definition, the market
structure analysis considers the dynamics in both the supplier and dealer markets. The U.S.
Healthcare court did not examine the provider market at all and only investigated the insurance
market in the context of the monopoly cause of action. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying
text. Though perhaps justifiably the court found no market power, it could not completely have
understood the way the market operated without having gone through the two-tiered investigation
used in these Guidelines. Yet its failure to do so probably resulted more from the plaintiff's in-
adequate presentation of the case than from an oversight on the part of the court.
It seems likely that the DOJ still examines the market structure at both levels in
accordance with this methodology despite the fact that these Guidelines no longer are used. Yet
whereas previously firms with satisfactory VRIs and coverage ratios would have escaped
prosecution by the DOJ, these safe harbors have been removed by Assistant Attorney General
Anne Bingaman. Supra note 102.
118. Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. at 6270. This factor also concerned Justice
O'Connor in Jefferson Parish where she indicated that courts should look at the ease of finding
new suppliers or purchasers. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 23-
26 and accompanying text (discussing the significance to the economic model of the rivals' ability
to compensate for the foreclosure).
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the main concern, then ease of entry is crucial because real
foreclosure of a market would be impossible if the market
under restraint could expand easily.1 9 One important criterion
for determining ease of entry is the degree of necessary invest-
ment in specialized production equipment or training.12 The
Guidelines also suggest considering the degree to which the
VRI and coverage ratios exceed that allowed. 2' Moreover,
they look at the length of the restraint's term because a longer
term inhibits rivals from entering into the market." The min-
imum efficient scale of operations also is important because
foreclosure is of lesser importance if a new firm needs only to
secure few inputs to run efficiently.'2 Intent of management
in entering into the restraint also might be indicative of the
effects of the structure. 24 The size of the firms using the re-
straint similarly is significant because small firms might need
restraints to increase efficiency through better product manage-
ment."z With these mitigating factors, the Guidelines can
help an adjudicator infer the actual competitive state of a po-
tentially anticompetitive exclusionary vertical restraint.
Not satisfied with the DOJ's pronouncement, the National
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) developed its own
guidelines for examining the anticompetitive effects of a verti-
cal restraint."' Although in most respects they are similar,
the DOJ and NAAG guidelines differ in some fundamental
ways. Most significantly, the NAAG collapses the two-step
analysis established by the DOJ into one. Concentration and
coverage are considered among a list of discretionary factors as
opposed to being a threshold consideration. 27 The NAAG al-
119. Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. at 6270. The Guidelines also list factors
related to the ease of collusion, such as the homogeneity of the product and the history of
collusion in the industry. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 6270-71.
123. Id. at 6271.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Kevin J. O'Connor, VerticalRestraints Guidelines, in 28TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTI-
TRUST SEMINAR: DisTRBmuToN AND MARKETING 565,565 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Hand-
book Series No. 625, 1988).
127. Id. at 578-79 (explaining that the NAAG avoids using thresholds, finding them arbi-
trary and imprecise).
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so looks at significant market influences, such as the amount of
pressure the dealer placed on the supplier to enter into a re-
straint," the rigidity of the restraint,129 the actual effect on
output, 130  the effect on consumer choice, 3 1  and the regula-
tory environment of the industry.1 32 Inasmuch as these factors
are as significant in potentially anticompetitive industries as the
factors enumerated by the DOJ, the courts should thoroughly
consider both lists whenever they adjudicate vertical restraint
causes of action.
Although not as thoroughly delineated as the 1985 Guide-
lines, the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) joint-
ly have developed a set of principles for investigating vertical
restraints specifically within the health care industry. 33 The
overriding concern of these principles is the degree to which a
restraint hampers the ability of competing networks to operate
within the market. 134 The analysis begins with an examination
of the concentration within the relevant market. 35 After ana-
lyzing the market structure, the agencies then look at other
factors that might lead to anticompetitive effects. These include
the ability and willingness of purchasers to switch between
different networks, the quality and range of services of other
networks, the terms and duration of the exclusionary agree-
ment, the number of providers necessary to establish a viable
network, and any justifications for the arrangement."M Be-
cause these factors are indicative of anticompetitive effects on
128. Id. at 575-76.
129. Id. at 577.
130. Id. at 580 (describing that it is likely that the restraint will be efficient if a vertical
restraint is followed by a subsequent increase in output).
131. Id. at 581 (explaining that an increase in the number of goods of differing price and
quality is a likely indicator of procompetitive effects of a restraint).
132. Id.
133. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. AND FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENTS OF ENFORCEMENT
POLICY AND ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO HEALTH CARE AND ANTrrRUST (1994)
(addressing nine areas of antitrust enforcement policy regarding mergers and various joint
activities in the health care area).
134. Id. at 101.
135. Id. at 97. Although these factors are discussed in relation to horizontal restraints, the
text describing vertical restraints states that the factors to be considered are largely the same. Id. at
101.
136. Id. at 99-100. Some of these factors are refinements for the health care industry of
earlier guidelines proposed by the DOJ and the NAAG. For instance, earlier guidelines included
considerations of the rigidity of the restraint, the duration of the restraint, the minimum efficient
scale of operations, and the intent of management. See supra text accompanying notes 118-32.
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rivals caused by an exclusionary vertical relationship in a
health care network, they warrant special attention by adjudica-
tive bodies.
IV. INFERRING INJURY TO CONSUMERS THROUGH
THE RAISING OF RIVALS' COSTS IN THE HEALTH
CARE SETTING
When examining cases where there is a danger that an
HMO has raised its rivals' costs through imposing an
exclusionary restraint on its providers, courts should not simply
accept the U.S. Healthcare and Marshfield courts' findings in
this area. Although these courts only had access to the limited
information presented to them in the lower courts' records,
there is a vast array of information about the present state of
the health care industry that can illustrate fully the possibility
of anticompetitive effects arising from exclusionary behavior
within a given market. Before an HMO successfully can im-
pose an exclusionary restraint that raises rivals' costs, the mar-
ket must satisfy all the necessary conditions: i) consumers must
be willing to enroll in the HMO that is imposing the
exclusionary restraint despite its supracompetitive pricing; ii)
the HMO's actions must raise its rivals' costs as an immediate
effect; and, iii) its rivals must not be able to respond to any
resulting industry shortage through increased production.137
The common law also has expressed a concern for similar
conditions,'38 and the DOJ, the NAAG, and the FTC have
followed Supreme Court precedent by enumerating various
benchmarks that indicate the degree to which these conditions
are present.'39 Within the health care industry context, re-
searchers have developed many tools that make use of these
benchmarks in determining the likelihood of anticompetitive
tendencies resulting from exclusionary restraints within a given
health care market. Thus, when examining exclusionary re-
straints imposed on providers by HMOs, lawyers and judges
137. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of these
elements to the economic model of the HMO industry).
138. See supra notes 48,51, and 58 (discussing various criteria used by courts to determine
if an antitrust injury exists).
139. See supra part ll.B.
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should apprise themselves of such analytical tools available to
them in order to better conform to the goals of the antitrust
laws.
A. Determining Consumer Demand
Before an HMO can charge supracompetitive prices to
take advantage of its enhanced position relative to its competi-
tors resulting from its exclusionary restraints, it must be as-
sured that its consumers will not switch to alternative health
care financing agents. One can predict the likely consumer
reaction to anticompetitive behavior by defining the elasticity
of demand. According to the DOJ Guidelines, which follow the
common law, the best approach is to examine the product and
geographic markets at both levels of the restraint. From this
examination, a court can develop a clear picture of how con-
sumers will react to supracompetitive pricing by an anticompet-
itive HMO imposing an exclusionary restraint on its providers,
which helps indicate the likelihood of its success.
1. Product Market Definition
a. The Insurer Market
Though the U.S. Healthcare and Marshfield courts had
insufficient evidence to disprove the existence of cross-elastic-
ity between HMO insurance and traditional FFS insurance,"
studies indicate that cross-elasticity actually may not exist.
When one looks at different studies indicating consumer per-
140. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1411 (7th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996) (stating that the trial court record did not provide adequate
evidence of a submarket); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 599 (1 st Cir.
1993) (claiming that the plaintiff did not argue the point well). See also supra note 73 (defining
cross-elasticity). In its consideration of the cross-elasticity between these two insurance products,
the U.S. Healthcare trial court stated that "pointing out the personal preferences of a distinct
group of consumers does not suffice for defining a separate product market." U.S. Healthcare, Inc.
v. Healthsource, Inc., Civ. No. 91-113-D, 1992 WL 59713, at *6 (D.N.H. Jan. 30, 1992), affd,
986 F.2d 589 (Ist Cir. 1993). The appellate court, however, accepted that preferences as il-
lustrated in customer surveys are one important criterion to consider. U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at
599. It also suggested looking at patterns of usage, feature differences, and profits to get at the
actual degree of cross-elasticity. Id. This view also accords with the DOJ Vertical Restraints
Guidelines, which look at buyer and seller perceptions and behavior. See supra text
accompanying note 107.
[Vol. 6:391
UNBRIDLED MANAGED CARE
ceptions and consumption patterns, there is only minimal evi-
dence of cross-elasticity.
Even if the cost is a perceived difference between HMOs
and FFS plans, it is certainly not the only one. In U.S.
Healthcare, the court described the difference between HMOs
and traditional FFS insurance as a tradeoff between price and
choice of doctor. 4' Thus, if consumers found the restriction
of the choice of doctor to be valued at roughly the difference
in the price of the plans, then they would be cross-elastic. In
other words, the HMO could not succeed in raising prices sig-
nificantly above market price because the elastic demand
would mean it would quickly lose market share to FFS insur-
ers. However, one study points out that seventy-five percent of
consumers value guaranteed health insurance coverage more
than choice of physician. 42  Since HMOs often provide
guaranteed coverage for a large number of services, 43 it
seems likely that this significant segment of the population
would value an HMO policy more than a FFS policy, based
solely on their differing characteristics, and not on price.144
Hence, for this group, HMO financing is not merely an inferior
good.
Guaranteed health insurance coverage for a wide range of
services is not the only feature that compensates enrollees for
foregoing choice of doctor. One study has shown that other
services typically important to those who choose IIMOs in-
clude better preventive care coverage, reduced paperwork, and
shorter waiting times in doctors' offices. 45 Another study has
indicated that HMO consumers also base their decisions on
characteristics like twenty-four hour accessibility of providers
141. 986 F.2d at 599.
142. Consumer Poll: Guaranteed Coverage Outweighs MD Choice, HOsPITALS, Mar. 20,
1994, at 106.
143. BERMAN & RosE, supra note 7, at 64.
144. Although guaranteed coverage arguably is related to cost, the HMO also is relieving the
consumer of the burden of planning a budget around expected future costs for uncovered
procedures. The HMO also removes the consumer's fear of undergoing a treatment only to
discover ex post that it is not covered. Thus there is an emotional benefit here as well as a
financial one.
145. See Goutam Chakraborty et al., How Consumers Choose Health Insurance, J. HEALTH
CARE MARKETING, Spring 1994, at 21, 31 (discussing the features of a health plan important to
subjects in one study who did not choose the BCUBS type of FFS insurance from among several
different kinds of plans).
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and concentration of family practitioners and specialists in the
same location." Thus, consumers perceive HMOs and FFS
insurance as highly differentiated services.
Behavior patterns also indicate that consumers treat HMO
insurance differently from FFS insurance. Since employers are
the entities presently most responsible for private insurance
coverage," an examination of consumption patterns in the
employment environment can illustrate one area where an anti-
trust injury could have significant ramifications. Ostensibly,
once an employer offers an HMO plan, a certain percentage of
employees immediately signs up and continues coverage
through the HMO over the course of time." This group of
employees does not seem to react to relative changes in
price." This lack of cross-elasticity is most clearly evidenced
146. S.E. Berki & Marie L.F. Ashcraft, HMO Enrollment: Who Joins What and Why: A Re-
view of the Literature, 58 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q., HEALTH AND Soc'y 588, 620-23
(1980). These characteristics seemingly have evolved to satisfy the needs of a certain type of
clientele. An emphasis on preventive care instead of intensive care would appeal more to
healthier, and thus to some degree, younger people. With less paperwork, shorter waiting times,
and easier access to all of one's doctors at the same location, HMOs are designed to be conve-
nient. These services have a strong appeal to highly productive people with large opportunity
costs. This might hold true more for younger people who are fully employed as opposed to older
people who have either retired or entered into semi-retirement. This profile of the healthy, young
enrollee is borne out by studies of different enrollee populations. Paul A. Pautler & Michael G.
Vita, Hospital Market Structure, Hospital Competition, and Consumer Welfare: What Can the
Evidence Tell Us?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 117, 160 (1994) (comparing health of
fee-for-service and IIMO populations). For young, mobile people who lack a standing patient-
physician relationship because they have recently relocated, lack of a choice of a doctor also will
be a less significant factor in the decision-making process. See Berki & Ashcraft, supra note 146,
at 622 (indicating studies that show an inverse relationship between length of residence in a
community and duration of employment with likelihood of joining an HMO).
147. As pointed out supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text, employer coverage is declining.
However, it still accounts for the bulk of insurance coverage for the American populace.
148. See Maureen Cameron, Indemnity Plans Costs Rise While Managed Care Prices
Moderate, Bus. & HEALTH, Apr., 1993, at 22 (stating that the growth in managed care enrollment
results more from increasing numbers of employers offering these plans than to increasing
numbers of enrollees in established managed care plans).
149. Id. at 24. By way of illustration, Cameron points to 1992 statistics. In that year, FFS
insurance prices increased six percent more than HMO prices increased (14.2% for FFS insurance
and 8.8% for HMO insurance), but HMO enrollment grew only two percent (from 33% to 35%).
Id. In the same year, the growth in the percentage of employers who offered HMO insurance plans
also was two percent (from 61% to 63%). Id. at 24. Though these figures seem to indicate a
distinct consumer preference for HMOs for certain people, there is room for distortion here. In
some cases, the behavior patterns do not indicate a choice. Even as recently as 1984, only one-
fifth of all employees had at least two choices of health care plans. Richard G. Frank & W.P.
Welch, The Competitive Effects of HMOs: A Review of the Evidence, 22 INQUIRY 148, 149 (1985).
Hence one must look at behavior patterns for individual markets in any specific case to determine
actual behavior patterns within the employment environment in question.
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by the fact that many employers have destroyed incentives for
their employees to consider price by subsidizing expensive
plans to the point that all plans become equally priced.50
Thus, employees in this situation choose a plan only along
nonprice lines."' Since a distinct group gravitates toward
HMOs even when there is no difference in price, it is clear that
there is no cross-elasticity for these people."2 Absent con-
sumer sensitivity to the price of FFS insurance, an HMO can
raise its prices easily and profitably if it has blocked other
HMOs from competing in the area. Thus, courts should not in-
elude FFS insurance in the relevant product market.
Yet, despite its seeming irrelevance in the choice of a
health care financing product, price is a factor for some people
in some situations. If price were no consideration, IMO
enrollees and FFS plan enrollees would switch freely between
plans until they found the plan whose characteristics were the
most satisfactory. In other words, they would act as if the pric-
es were exactly the same and thus only the suitability of cer-
tain plan features would be important. Yet research in the area
of consumer satisfaction is mixed. According to one review,
the majority of studies conducted to date indicate that IIMO
enrollees are not as satisfied with their perceived quality of
care or their patient-physician interactions as are enrollees of
FFS insurance plans.' Although the majority of the studies
showed a lack of satisfaction, several studies showed that
150. Alain C. Enthoven, Multiple Choice Health Insurance: The Lessons and Challenge to
Employers, 27 INQUIRY 368,369 (1990).
151. Enthoven speculates that this pattern is likely to continue because the tax system favors
it through its preferential treatment of benefits, and union leaders have always argued for full
benefits as an important issue. Id. Enthoven also explains that this insurance system allows HMOs
to raise their prices to approximate FFS plan prices and thereby extract economic rents from their
consumers. Id. at 370. He suggests that managed care organizations should stay divided into
competing economic units as one way to avoid this problem. Id. at 372.
152. Two products are cross-elastic only if a slight increase in the competitive price of one
leads to an increase in consumption of the other. Supra note 73. In other words, each good is
considered to offer equal value for its competitive price from the perspective of the consumer.
Since the costs of FFS insurance are higher than HMO insurance, a competitive market would al-
ways cause FFS insurance to be priced higher than HMO insurance. If the higher price reflects
higher value to consumers, they would always choose FFS insurance when it is equally priced
with HMO insurance. Since some consumers prefer HMO insurance even when they are equally
priced, for them there is little cross-elasticity between these products.
153. Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance Since 1980: A
Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512, 1516 (1994).
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HMO enrollees were highly satisfied with their plans.'54
Moreover, in all the studies reviewed, HMO enrollees were
more satisfied with the financial aspects of their plan than
indemnity plan enrollees. 55 From these data, one can see that
there is some trade-off between satisfaction with quality and
satisfaction with price which would cause some people to
switch to FFS insurance if the price of HMO insurance in-
creased. Yet the present price level already might reflect
anticompetitive pricing if the HMO has no competitors that can
force it to set its prices competitively.'56 Even when there are
consumers whose dissatisfaction would lead them to switch to
FFS insurance when their HMO premium increases slightly,
they probably do not account for a large percentage of the
consumer market. Other consumers who are mostly satisfied
with the quality of their health care will exhibit greater resis-
tance towards switching insurance, depending upon their degree
of dissatisfaction with HMO services and with the perceived
value of FFS insurance. Since many consumers are not ready
to switch when HMO premiums rise slightly, cross-elasticity
between these products is far from perfect even where consum-
ers consider these forms of health care financing as substitutes
for each other.
When price is an overriding consideration, it is still un-
likely to result in perfect cross-elasticity because of imperfect
information regarding the actual prices of the different
plans. 57 Thus, cross-elasticity would have to be determined
154. Id. In five studies, seven of eight observations showed enrollee dissatisfaction with
HMOs relative to FFS enrollees, but in four studies, four of five observations showed high
satisfaction with HMOs. Id. Thus in contrast to the Marshfield court's assertions, quite a few
people are so satisfied with their plans that they probably are not concerned with the incentives to
reduce care. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1410 (7th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996).
155. Miller & Luft, supra note 153. See also Chakraborty, supra note 145, at 31 (stating that
premiums are one of several important aspects in the decision-making process of non-BCIBS
enrollees). In one study, HMO enrollment increased proportionately to the increase in the cost of
FFS insurance when both types of policies were offered by the employer without any subsidies.
Frank & Welch, supra note 149, at 155. Yet this study might not have been based on a typical
HMO with all of its unique characteristics. Despite its limitations, this study illustrates that price
is definitely a factor to some degree for some employees who bear some of the financial risk for
their choice.
156. See supra note 73 (stating that even if consumers would switch to a substitute when the
price of a product rises, this fact does not refute market power because the firm already could be
charging supracompetitive prices).
157. In determining the expected price of different plans, an enrollee will base his price
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by perceived price. Even though there are enrollees for whom
enrollment is highly price elastic, there likely will be enough
enrollees for whom price is neither a major consideration nor
accurately determinable, that the HMO has an opportunity to
extract economic rents by raising its prices to an above optimal
level if its only major competitor is a FFS insurance plan.
Thus, FFS insurance plans should not be considered part of the
same market when determining the likely consumer reaction to
the supracompetitive pricing of an HMO that has successfully
driven up the costs of its rivals through the imposition of an
exclusionary restraint.
b. The Provider Market
Once the financing product market is defined, the delivery
market, the second market affected by the vertical restraint,
must be clearly delineated. To raise rivals' costs, an HMO
must have exclusive rights over the range of inputs that con-
sumers consider to be a vital part of a functional HMO. Since
health care consumers do not pay for services individually,
they will not look at services on a treatment-by-treatment ba-
sis. 58 For example, they are not likely to choose one plan
because of its participating hospital's reputation for appendec-
tomies. Rather, they will look at more global characteristics,
such as the reputation of its family doctors, the likelihood that
its specialists work with the latest high-tech equipment, and the
prestige of the facilities offering the most sophisticated services
within the HMO. These are salient characteristics that might
become selling points of one HMO as opposed to another.
These important distinctions among the plans can be broken
evaluations on out-of-pocket expenses for his premium as well as for his copayment and
deductible for any medical services he expects to use during his enrollment period. Berki &
Ashcraft, supra note 146, at 617. Because an individual might not understand the mechanics of
different plans due to imperfect information of the plan features, an insurer can adjust the
premium, copayment, and deductibles to hide costs from consumers and thus remove any cross-
elasticity based on actual price. See AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 73, at 12 (mentioning the
imperfect knowledge of buyers as one cause of market distortion). Further, many people are risk
averse and thus will overweigh the expected costs of copayments and deductibles above their
statistical probability.
158. See Jack Zwanziger et al., Hospitals and Antitrust: Defining Markets, Setting
Standards, 19 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 423, 431 (1994) (claiming that HMOs and PPOs
compete along overall level of price, rather than along the price of individual procedures).
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down into categories. The perceived quality of an HMO will
depend upon the separate credentials of its primary, secondary,
and tertiary care centers.'59 Since an HMO restricts its
enrollees from seeking medical treatment outside of its provid-
er network, it must offer all three levels of care to attract an
adequate client base. The courts must examine each of these
product markets separately to determine if rival HMOs have
access to enough substitute sources of care to attract enrollees
if the anticompetitive HMO increases its prices.
2. Geographic Market Definition
a. The HMO Market
Although there are several nationwide HMOs, any one
branch will face competition only in a limited region. Unlike
the U.S. Healthcare district court's finding that the appropriate
market should be the whole state of New Hampshire,'"' con-
sumer perceptions and behavior patterns indicate that competi-
tion exists only between HMOs whose provider networks are
situated in the same narrowly defined geographic area. Since
people will not enroll in an HMO if it is inconveniently locat-
ed, 6' there is no basis for a perception of statewide
interchangeability. The perception that only local HMOs are
good substitutes for each other manifests itself in consumer
behavior. People tend not to go very far to receive the bulk of
their health care. 62 An HMO must offer treatment by physi-
cians and hospitals near the consumers it is targeting before it
will be successful. An HMO's geographic market should be
defined narrowly when hypothesizing about consumer reactions
to supracompetitive pricing to best reflect these perceptions and
159. Id. DRGs encompass all procedures at all levels of care, and thus an examination of
groups of DRGs could serve to illustrate consumer consumption of health care services falling
into different levels of care. Yet the Marshfield court did not accept their application to product
market definition. Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1411.
160. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., Civ. No. 91-113-D, 1992 WL 59713, at *5
(D.N.H. Jan. 30, 1992), affd, 986 F.2d 589 (lst Cir. 1993) (basing its finding on the areas in
which the HMOs were recruiting and marketing). When considering the relevant market in its
examination of the § 2 violation, the appellate court opted not to question the geographic market
because the product market, when defined as all health care financing, was already too large ever
to allow monopoly rents. U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 599.
161. Berki & Ashcraft, supra note 146, at620.
162. See infra part IV.A.2.b.
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behavior patterns.
b. The Provider Market
Since an HMO's geographic market so closely approxi-
mates the provider geographic market, the antitrust analyst
needs only to study consumer perceptions and behavior in
relation to the provider geographic market to determine the
range in which an HMO can perpetrate an antitrust injury
through raising rivals' costs. Within the provider market, there
are different geographic ranges for primary, secondary, and
tertiary care.'63 Though consumers might not perceive a local
hospital as a reasonable alternative for a distant teaching hospi-
tal for tertiary care, they usually will prefer a local hospital for
primary or secondary care.1"4 When examining behavior, a re-
searcher can benefit from investigatory tools like the Elzinga-
Hogarty test.'65 After looking at the data, one can see that
there is a correlation between the degree of specialization re-
163. The courts differ on this point. In United States v. Carillon Health Sys., 707 F. Supp.
840 (W.D. Va. 1989), aff d, 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989), the court allowed a much vaster
market for the defendants' tertiary services than for their primary and secondary services. Id. at
847-48. However, the Rockford Memorial court refused to find that competition between tertiary
centers justified distinguishing a separate geographic market. United States v. Rockford Memorial
Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1276 (N.D. Ill. 1989), affd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990).
164. Jonathan B. Baker, The Antitrust Analysis of Hospital Mergers and the Transformation
of the Hospital Industry, 51 LAw & CONTEM . PROBS. 93, 142-43 (1988) (referring to limitation
of geographic scope of markets due to unwillingness of patients to seek care at hospitals far from
their residences).
165. The Elzinga-Hogarty test (E-H test) actually consists of an examination of both the
"little in from the outside" (LIFO) aspect as well as the "little out from the inside" (LOFI) aspect.
The researcher uses these measurements to define a region in which a chosen percentage of the
output purchased by customers in the area comes from local producers (LIFO) and in which the
same percentage of shipments from firms within the market is to customers within the area
(LOFI). Michael A. Morrisey et al., Defining Geographical Markets for Hospital Care, 51 LAW &
CON'EMP. PROBS. 165, 168-69 (1988). This test is commonly used within the health care
litigation context. For example, the FTC used it in In re American Medical International, Inc., 104
F.T.C. 1, 195-96 (1984), and in In re Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 438 (1985).
However, the agency clarified that the test results need to be qualified by adding hospitals that
might be used as substitutes when prices rise even if present patient flow patterns do not indicate
their use. Id. at 472. The test also was used in United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F.
Supp. 1251, 1267 (N.D. Ill. 1989), affd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
920 (1990). More recently, the district court in Marshfield admitted E-H results for consideration
by the jury in examining the foreclosure of provider services through the clinic's exclusionary
restraints. Marshfield, 883 F. Supp. at 1256. The circuit court, however, disapproved of the
breakdown of health care services and their concomitant markets along DRG lines. Marshfield, 65
F.3d at 1411.
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quired to treat an illness and the distance patients travel to
receive care." For general care, which constitutes the bulk
of patient visits, patients are not willing to travel very far.'67
Because the geographic range of substitutes acceptable to con-
sumers does not extend very far, an HMO could raise its prices
without fear of losing its enrollees to rivals by entering into
exclusionary agreements that limit rivals' access to primary
care providers in a confined region. Similarly, such arguments
could be made with secondary or tertiary care providers althou-
gh in a somewhat broader region.
B. Evaluating the Degree to Which the Exclusionary Restraint
Raises Rivals' Costs
Once a court has delineated the range of reasonable substi-
tutes for the consumers in both markets, it must determine the
degree to which the anticompetitive HMO's exclusionary con-
duct imposes costs on its rivals through foreclosure of these
markets. Concentration in both markets plays a major role in
determining the degree of foreclosure. 16' However, other as
166. Zwanziger et al., supra note 158, at 432. See also Marjorie A. McGuirk & Frank W.
Porell, Spatial Patterns of Hospital Utilization: The Impact of Distance and Time, 21 INQUIRY 84,
93 (1984) (qualifying the importance of distance by claiming that consumers actually are most
reactive to travel time). Though generally there is a correlation between the intensity of care and
the distance a consumer is willing to travel to receive it, a subset of the consumer market
considers the cost of traveling to providers less important than the value of receiving the best care
possible, irrespective of the level of intensity. Thus Morrisey et al. found that some patients
traveled long distances even after they excluded those traveling to receive treatment for complex
diseases. Morrisey et al., supra note 165, at 189. Yet this group did not account for the bulk of
consumers. When setting the E-H test at 75%, they found that the average market area was 2.5
counties for the area under investigation. Id. at 183. However this market expanded more than
twofold to six counties when the test was set at 90%. Id. at 18 1. Since an antitrust injury can occur
even if only 75% of a given market is not willing to travel far to receive health care, it makes
more sense not to expand the market too far just for the sake of accuracy. Rather, a realistic
approach that accounts for outliers will more effectively define a market for antitrust purposes.
167. See Zwanziger et al., supra note 158, at 432. Even though hospitals are not as easily
accessible in rural areas, consumers will not travel very far to get primary health care. Thus the
county is already too large a measure of the appropriate market based upon behavior. See
generally Brigid Goody, Defining Rural Hospital Markets, 28 HEALTH SERV. RES. 183 (1993)
(describing recent trends in analyzing the rural hospital market by using geographic and socio-
economic-demographic factors). One researcher points out that this preference for local providers
for primary care is usually a reasonable choice for most people. Because friends and family are
less likely to go long distances to pay visits to patients, choosing a nearby provider will mean
more emotional support during periods of hospitalization. Morrisey et al., supra note 165, at 170.
Likewise, for routine exams, opportunity costs are lower if the doctor is nearby because of the
lesser travel time.
168. Concentration also indicates market power, which is an element of a Sherman § 1 cause
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pects of an HMO's conduct might either mitigate or reinforce
the anticompetitive effects of its restraint. These factors also
merit consideration by the courts.
1. Dangerous Concentration
a. The HMO Market
Concentration within a market, which was considered the
threshold issue in the DOJ Guidelines, plays a significant role
in evaluating the tendency towards anticompetitive effects. A
high VRI 69 in the HMO financing market indicates that rela-
tively few HMOs employ vertical restraints, but that they con-
stitute a large share of the consumer market. Under these cir-
cumstances, the HMOs easily can raise their prices above com-
petitive levels and rely on others to do the same."' By im-
posing exclusionary restraints in concert with each other, even
a group of small HMOs can raise the costs of other competi-
tors who become unable to contract with a sufficient number of
providers to ran efficiently. Conversely, an unconcentrated
HMO financing market is ideal because the HMO lacks suf-
ficient bargaining power to impose any significant exclusionary
restraints upon providers. Therefore, no individual HMO can
raise competitors' costs by preventing access to key inputs.
Moreover, each HMO must compete actively against rival
HMOs for consumers by keeping its prices down."' In this
kind of market, the HMO faces competition in both the provid-
er and consumer market, which leads to an efficient indus-
try." Hence, HMO market concentration is one indicator of
the likelihood of the success of exclusionary restraints in rais-
ing rivals' costs.
of action. See supra note 63 (enumerating the elements of this cause of action). See infra notes
320, 326 (discussing the way courts interpret the relation between market share and monopoly
power).
169. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (defining the VRI).
170. See AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 73, at 276 (discussing the interdependence engen-
dered by oligopolistic markets).
171. Id.
172. This is only true if competition among HMOs actually results in lower prices. There is
some evidence that HMO competition leads to competitive pricing. See Stuart Gannes, Strong
Medicine for Health Bills, FORTuNE, Apr. 13, 1987, at 70 (reporting that both Chicago and Miami
Beach employers experienced lower health care premiums as a result of increased HMO
competition).
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b. The Provider Market
High concentration within the provider market is another
factor that facilitates the success of an HMO's exclusionary re-
straint in raising its rivals' costs. The concentration of the pro-
vider market, as measured by its VRI, indicates the strength of
the firms in it relative to firms in linked markets. Increased
provider bargaining power is one source of increased costs for
rival HMOs trying to enter the market.173 Thus, there is a
question as to how low concentration must be to allow bargain-
ing between providers and insurers that will bring the price of
health care to its optimal level. This question is still largely an
epistemological one because health care providers have not fit
the profile of a competitive industry until recently. Concentra-
tion has had no meaning in this setting. When FFS insurance
was the only major form of health care financing available,
financing agents did not require hospitals or doctors to compete
along price lines. They simply passed all costs back to the
consumer in the form of higher premiums.'74 Without any in-
centive to contain costs, providers competed for patients along
non-price lines. 75 In this environment, lower concentration
actually meant higher prices.'76 With the diffusion of prospec-
tive payment and capitation, however, providers are competing
173. The DOJ Vertical Restraint Guidelines consider only the sum of the squares of the
market shares of the firms involved in some kind of vertical restraint. See supra note 115
(defining the VRI). Yet it seems more appropriate to consider the market shares of all the firms in
the market when considering the degree to which rivals' costs will be affected. Since the providers
not under the restraint will be dealing with a potential entrant into the HMO market, one can infer
their bargaining strength by considering the power of all the providers within the market. Adding
up the squares of the market shares of all the provider groups, the concentration figure accounts
for both the size and number of the provider groups, which in combination creates their power. If
the market is dominated by a few providers, they will tend to demand supracompetitive pricing
because they know that there are few other choices of providers with whom an HMO can
negotiate. This consideration of all the fins within a market resembles the recommended
procedure for examining horizontal mergers as announced by the DOJ in its 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,557 (1992) (proposed Sept. 10, 1992) (describing
how to calculate market shares). Within the horizontal restraint context, the measure of
concentration is called the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which consists of the sum of the
squares of the market shares of all the firms in a market. Id.
174. BERMAN & ROSE, supra note 7, at 18.
175. See Xuan Nguyen Nguyen & Frederick W. Derrick, Hospital Markets and
Competition: Implications for Antitrust Policy, HEALTH CARE MGMT. REv., Winter 1994, at 34
(discussing a study which reflects that hospitals in competitive environments have utilized more
labor and capital and have had more services than hospitals in non-competitive environments).
176. Id.
426 [Vol. 6:391
UNBRIDLED MANAGED CARE
along price as well as quality lines. 77 Since HMO payment
mechanisms have helped create this price competition, concen-
tration becomes a meaningful indicator of the ease with which
HMOs effectively can keep provider prices down. Even if one
HMO is competing with another HMO that has imposed
exclusionary restraints upon a group of providers, low concen-
tration in the provider market might signify that rival HMOs
still will not experience increased costs.
Nonetheless, the exact effect concentration has on price is
still unclear. The studies vary greatly. While one study claimed
that there must be at least twenty-four hospitals in an area
before there are competitive effects, 7 ' another found a differ-
ence in competitiveness with only ten hospitals in an area. 79
Yet another study found that only three hospitals are necessary
before some competition exists.' Though these studies cre-
177. See Pautler & Vita, supra note 146, at 140 & n.95 (summarizing several recent studies
that employed defensible methodologies in researching the connection between price and
concentration within the hospital industry).
178. James C. Robinson, HMO Market Penetration and Hospital Cost Inflation in Cali-
fornia, 266 JAMA 2719, 2722 (1991). This study looked at the degree to which lower hospital
costs correlate with HMO market penetration to determine if HMOs have had a competitive effect
on cost containment. Id. at 2719. The product market consisted of various broadly defined
services that do not relate directly to primary, secondary, and tertiary care services. Id. at 2719.
The geographic market consisted of all hospitals within a 24 kilometer radius of the one under
investigation, regardless of patient perceptions and behavior patterns. Id. All of the hospitals
under investigation in the study were in California. Id. at 2719. Only with high HMO market
penetration and a hospital market with at least 24 neighboring competitors did the study reveal
any significant decreasing effect on price. Id. If one were to assume that each of these hospitals
had an equal share of the market, then the HHI would be 24(4.2)2 - 201.6, which is a very low
market concentration.
179. James C. Robinson & Harold S. Luft, Competition, Regulation, and Hospital Costs,
1982 to 1986, 260 JAMA 2676, 2679 (1988) (as evidenced by the data displayed in Table 1).
Trying to determine the effect of different regulatory policies on hospital costs, these researchers
used data on 5490 hospitals nationwide with no differentiation between different financing
mechanisms. Further, there was no differentiation as to the intensity of care provided. Id. at 2676.
Hospital markets were determined to be those that fell within a 24 kilometer radius of the one
under investigation, regardless of patient perceptions and behavior patterns. Id. at 2677. The
researchers then compared the data on a state-by-state basis simultaneously to examine the effects
of different regulatory policies and of market concentration on the increase in costs. Id. at 2678-
79. Consistently, inflation rates were lower in markets with more than 10 competitors. Id. at 2679.
If all of the hospitals are assumed to have equal market share, the HHI for this market would be
10(10)2 - 1000.
180. Glenn A. Melnick et al., The Effects of Market Structure and Bargaining Position on
Hospital Prices, 11 J. HEALTH ECON. 217, 229 (1992) (finding that a merger of two hospitals in a
market of three hospitals of equal market share would raise prices by nine percent). This study set
out to find the effects of competition among hospitals on the prices hospitals charge PPOs. Id. at
217-18. The researchers based their findings on prices paid by Blue Cross PPO networks to
California hospitals. Id. at 222. They did not differentiate according to the intensity of care
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ate some understanding of the increasingly competitive nature
of the provider market, none of them resolve the question of
what degree of competition is necessary to avoid excessive
bargaining power by providers who remain free of restraints
when an HMO imposes an exclusionary contract upon other
providers in the market.
In an ideal setting, researchers would examine the effect
on price as opposed to cost. They would base their findings
exclusively on the prices that hospitals charge third party
payors who demand competitive pricing. Moreover, they would
study primary, secondary, and tertiary care separately because
each reacts differently to concentration. To best reflect realistic
market dynamics, they also would use a geographic market
based on consumer perceptions and behavior patterns. Once the
provider market has been properly delineated, researchers could
determine the threshold market concentration that would pro-
mote competition within each level of intensity of care. The
courts then could use this threshold as a benchmark for analyz-
ing a market in a specific case."' Until such a threshold has
been discovered, the courts should scrutinize carefully any
provided. However, in defining the competitors of a hospital under investigation, they based the
geographic market on empirical data of patient behavior patterns determined from discharge data
from the hospitals. Id. at 224. If it is true that a hospital market with only three equal competitors
is sufficient to generate some degree of competitiveness, then a market would need an HIl of
only 3267 to foster some competitive tendencies. This figure comes from: 3(33)' - 3267. See id.
181. Even if researchers discover the ideal number of competitors, the courts must accept
that the maximum amount of competition possible within some markets will be less than this ideal
number. This maximum number of sustainable competitors can be evaluated by first looking at
ordinary utilization patterns in communities that are the same size as the one under investigation.
After calculating how many manhours of service and hospital days would be needed to fulfill the
community's needs, a researcher can account for a reasonable level of capacity. From this figure,
the researcher can infer how many providers are needed to take care of a community. This can be
done separately for providers at each level of intensity of care. Then the researcher can determine
how many providers and facilities need to join together to generate economies of scale. After
calculating this figure, the researcher can divide the total number of providers needed by the
minimum number needed to achieve economies and derive the maximum number of independent
provider networks sustainable within a community. See Carl J. Schramm & Steven C. Renn,
Hospital Mergers, Market Concentration and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 33 EMORY LJ.
869, 885-86 (1984) (using this method to illustrate the high concentration resulting from ideal
capacity in a small market). It is likely that researchers will find that the maximum number of
provider networks still is insufficient to generate ideal competition in many small communities
which require few hospitals and doctors to handle all the community needs. See id. at 874
(pointing out that consolidation in 80% of all hospital markets would likely be challenged under
traditional HHI concentration standards because their premerger concentrations are already very
high).
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concentration to determine what effect it may have on an HMO
trying to enter into agreements with providers.
Consistent with the reasoning of the DOJ Guidelines, law-
yers and judges also should examine the coverage ratio of the
provider market to determine the likelihood of success in im-
posing costs on rivals through exclusionary restraints on pro-
viders.t"' This measure is useful in demonstrating the degree
to which there are free agents left to bargain with HMOs that
are not implementing exclusionary restraints. If the providers
under a vertical restraint account for too great a share of the
market, then the other providers will charge rival HMOs higher
rates. This results from the scarcity of supply created by the
agreement which allows the other providers' prices to rise.
When a vertical restraint is employed in a market that is al-
ready heavily concentrated, the providers outside of the re-
straint have two sources of bargaining power to give them
leverage over rival HMOs seeking to enter the market: they
benefit both from the artificial scarcity created by the foreclo-
sure of resources tied up in the exclusionary contract and from
the enhanced bargaining power of a highly concentrated mar-
ket.'83 In this scenario, an exclusionary restraint has a danger-
ous probability of creating anticompetitive effects.
2. The Length of the Term of the Agreement
Once the anticompetitive HMO forecloses a significant
portion of the market, it can strengthen its advantage by de-
manding that the providers adhere to the agreement for a
lengthy period of time. The policies established by both the
DOJ and the FTC entail examination of the length of the
agreement.'84  If an HMO succeeds in obtaining an
exclusionary right over the services of a group of providers for
several years, it is much worse than obtaining an exclusionary
right for only a few months. In U.S. Healthcare, the court
concluded that the thirty day notice period required for termi-
182. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (defining the coverage ratio).
183. Krattemnaker & Salop refer to this combination of a vertical restraint leading to
foreclosure of a segment of the supply market with oligopolistic power for the remaining sellers as
'Frankenstein's Monster.' Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 22, at 240-41.
184. See supra notes text accompanying notes 122 and 136.
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nating the contract had a de minimis effect on competition.'85
Yet there are cases in the industry where problems have arisen
because of substantially longer contracts in which the providers
have offered exclusivity to the HMO.'86 Hence, the temporal
characteristics of an agreement play an important role in deter-
mining the ability of the exclusionary relationship to raise
rivals' costs.
3. Rigidity of the Restraint
Similar to the length of an agreement, the rigidity with
which the exclusionary agreement denies rival HMOs access to
providers can significantly affect their degree of foreclosure.
The NAAG, DOJ, and FTC consider rigidity of agreements in
their interpretation of anticompetitive effects.'87 Since the de-
fendants in U.S. Healthcare entered into an agreement in which
they merely had the option of receiving a higher rate of capita-
tion for their services in exchange for exclusivity, the court
properly might have concluded that there was no Sherman
section 1 violation, absent other evidence of blocked access to
providers. 8  The HMO could have fortified the exclusionary
restraint with a stronger clause that entailed a refusal to deal
with any provider that offered its services to another HMO.
This would have been total foreclosure and a clearer violation
of antitrust laws.
4. The Amount of Pressure the Dealer Places on the Supplier
If an HMO is especially aggressive in demanding an
exclusionary right over a group of providers, its conduct might
indicate that the primary purpose of the relationship is the
attainment of a competitive advantage rather than increasing
efficiencies through integration. This potential to demonstrate
185. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589,596 (1st Cir. 1993). See also
Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1481 (D. Kan. 1987), aff d in part and
remanded in part, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990) (stating that
an agreement between an HMO and a hospital which could be terminated at will posed no
antitrust barrier).
186. See, e.g., Johnsson, supra note 27, at 23 (discussing PruCare's five-year exclusive
contract with Austin Regional Clinic and the related problems).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 129 and 136.
188. 986 F.2d at 593-94.
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intent has prompted the NAAG to state that it will examine the
degree to which the supplier has been pressured into entering
the restraint.'89 When an HMO succeeds in obtaining an
exclusionary right over a group of providers by inflicting heavy
pressure upon them, a court should strictly scrutinize the ability
of the agreement to impose costs on rivals.
5. Intent of Management
A clear statement of an intention to raise its rivals' costs
similarly would increase the probability that anticompetitive
effects would follow from an exclusionary agreement. The DOJ
Guidelines suggest considering this factor."9° If an HMO ex-
presses a wish to see its competitors go out of business, it
likely will use other hostile actions in addition to exclusionary
contracts to reach its goals. 9' Likewise, an express intent to
create efficiencies might mean that the HMO simply wants to
lower its production costs through vertical integration.1"
Courts might choose to give this factor significant weight in
determining the likelihood of anticompetitive effects because of
its ability to indicate the long-term effects of an exclusionary
restraint.
6. Size of Firms
Even if an HMO has exacted an exclusionary right over
providers that could raise rivals' costs, its size might indicate
that it is incapable of causing any significant anticompetitive
effects within the industry. The DOJ Guidelines suggest taking
size into account.'93 If a new HMO is small, it may need to
enter into an exclusionary agreement with providers to estab-
lish immediate goodwill.'94 Since the addition of a new com-
189. See supra text accompanying note 128.
190. See supra text accompanying note 124.
191. Conversely, subsequent acts that in no way benefit competition help a court infer
wrongful intent. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608
(1985) (finding lack of a business justification to be evidence of an intent to harm competitors
through exclusionary practices).
192. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (discussing the production efficiencies
that can come out of this kind of vertical relationship).
193. See supra text accompanying note 125.
194. Cf. infra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of goodwill
within the context of setting up physician practices).
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petitor into the market will have procompetitive effects, the
courts might find that exclusionary contracts in these circum-
stances do not impose costs on rivals sufficient to offend the
antitrust laws.
7. Nature of Purchasers
Similar to the inability of small HMOs to impose costs on
rivals, an HMO whose power is checked by large consumers
might argue that it is incapable of creating anticompetitive
effects within the market. When the consumer market consists
mostly of large employers who can purchase en masse, they
probably have enough influence to counterbalance the power of
the HMOs." They can bypass completely the HMO and ne-
gotiate directly with the providers if they believe that the HMO
is charging more than an optimal rate for its coverage. Yet size
alone is not enough. These large purchasing units must display
a desire to get the best buy in health care despite the tendency
towards inertia in changing insurance plans." Without this
drive for the optimal price, a large company will not benefit
from its size. Thus the DOJ and FTC Principles take into ac-
count the ability and the willingness of employers to change
networks.97 If the consumer market is filled with large,
price-sensitive purchasing units, the HMO might be imposing
the restraints to achieve efficiencies that will better serve its
demanding customers. Because of this potential to exculpate
exclusionary conduct that otherwise raises rivals' costs, courts
need to determine what role the purchasers play in the HMO
decision-making process.
195. See infra part VIII (concluding that the evolution of payor groups might be one solution
to undue insurer power). The integration of several large employers into one buying unit is one of
the reasons that health care costs have stayed so low in the Minneapolis-St. Paul region. Leigh
Page, Will Too Many Mergers Stifle Competition?, AM. MED. NEws, July 11, 1994, at 1, 6 (dis-
cussing the Business Health Care Action Group, which includes 3M, General Mills, and
Pillsbury).
196. Mark V. Pauly, Monopsony Power in Health Insurance: Thinking Straight While
Standing on Your Head, 6 J. HEALTH ECON. 73, 80 (1987) [hereinafter Pauly, Monopsony Power]
(giving evidence of the "preformed nature" and "persistence in health insurance" that works
contrary to purchasing units seeking new plans).
197. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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C. Determining the Ability of the Industry to Increase Output
in Response to Artificial Scarcity
Even if the HMO imposing the exclusionary restraint on
its providers succeeds in raising its rivals' costs, this advantage
could be mitigated by an increase in the production of HMO
services by rivals. The anticompetitive HMO can extract
supracompetitive profits from consumers only if its rivals'
increased costs and decreased access to providers results in a
decrease of HMO services offered to consumers.' This de-
crease in output results in an inflated consumer demand with a
concomitant rise in the price of HMO services. However, if the
market structure facilitates easy replacement of the foreclosed
resources, the HMO would realize only transient success in its
exclusionary behavior. Under such market conditions, the rival
IHMOs soon would produce new HMO services and the market
would return to equilibrium. Yet, if there are significant barri-
ers to entry, then courts should infer anticompetitive effects
and find antitrust liability because the costs imposed on rivals
through the exclusionary restraints likely would be significant
and chronic.
1. The Degree of Necessary Investment
One important criterion suggested by the DOJ Guidelines
for determining the strength of the barriers to entry into a mar-
ket is the degree of investment in specialized production equip-
ment or training necessary to become a viable competitor."9
Though the establishment of an HMO business might not re-
quire too much capital, startup costs can be prohibitively high
for health care providers. Hospitals have extremely high fixed
costs.' For secondary and tertiary care centers, the fixed
cost problem is naturally even greater. Doctors face high costs
when entering a market, partly because of the crucial role of
goodwill in developing and maintaining a patient base.2"' As
198. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
199. See supra text accompanying note 120.
200. Mark V. Pauly, Competition in Health Insurance Markets, 51 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 237, 266 (1988) [hereinafter Pauly, Competition] (arguing that the high fixed costs of
hospital construction act as a barrier to HMOs' building their own facilities).
201. See AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 73, at 22 (describing the promotional costs asso-
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the establishment of goodwill for a new practice can take quite
some time, that is, if the doctor is not buying another doctor's
practice, the new entrant should expect to sustain significant
initial losses due to high operating costs that cannot be covered
until a sufficient patient base has been established.'
These high financial costs and the lengthy time commit-
ment required to enter the market successfully might deter the
entry of many providers as well as HMOs interested in con-
structing their own facilities and hiring their own doctors.23
Thus, if an HMO acquires an exclusionary right over
providers' services, it can deprive rival HMOs of resources that
will not be regenerated quickly. This need for intensive invest-
ment militates against allowing restrictive practices.
2. The Minimum Efficient Scale of Operations
The DOJ and the FTC in their Principles place emphasis
on the role of scale economies in a health care market because
it is easier to raise rivals' costs by foreclosing part of the sup-
ply market when a firm needs to secure a wide range of inputs
to perform efficiently.'s In the health care context, an HMO
must contract with a vast array of providers representing dif-
ferent levels of intensity of care even if the HMO has few
enrollees. 5 If one assumes that at least three HMOs are nec-
essary to encourage competition among the different firms in
ciated with the accumulation of goodwill as a barrier to entry). See also Christine A. Hinz, Sizing
up the Value of Goodwill in a Practice: 'Intangible' Assets Toughest to Quantify for Seller, AM.
MED. NEWS, May 11, 1990, at 11, 16 (asserting that although goodwill is essential to a
physician's practice, it takes time to develop because it comes mostly from patient allegiance and
word of mouth).
202. See Anne Feltus, Health Care Climate Compels More Doctors to Join Forces, HOUS-
TON Bus. J., July 15-21, 1994, at 26 (stating that one out of three physicians nationwide now
belongs to a group practice to counteract the effects of high equipment costs and low rates of
reimbursements).
203. The U.S. Healthcare court did not mention these factors when it stated that doctors are
always coming into the market and thus preventing foreclosure of physician services. U.S.
Healtheare, Inc. v. Heathsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589,596 (lst Cir. 1993). The Marshfield court did
not seem concerned with these costs when it stated that an HMO's discouraging hospitals over
which it exercised influence from entering into contracts with other HMOs did not rise to the level
of an antitrust violation. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1413 (7th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 1288 (1996).
204. See supra notes 123, 136 and accompanying text.
205. See supra part W.A.L.b (discussing that in order for an HMO to increase its client base,
it must contract with a number of different types of health care providers).
434 (Vol. 6:391
1996] UNBRIDLED MANAGED CARE 435
the HMO industry, then one group of researchers has estimated
that at least 1.2 million people must reside in an area before
the three plans could be mutually exclusive.)°6 Thus, one
could argue that in any region with a population of less than
1.2 million, there is a need to avoid exclusive contracting due
to the potential for foreclosure of essential provider servic-
es.' These exclusive contracts are especially detrimental for
more intensive levels of care, and even exclusionary contracts
binding primary care physicians become suspect as the popula-
tion of the region decreases.'a Only after the courts have ex-
amined this demographic information can they accurately de-
tect the inability to set up a competing functional HMO within
206. Richard Kronick et al., The Marketplace in Health Care Reform: The Demographic
Limitations of Managed Competition, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 148, 150 (1993). Kronick et al.,
begin by assuming that three competitors would be necessary to prevent oligopolistic collusion.
Id. at 149. They then develop some idea of what must be included in an HMO package to be
inclusive of all necessary services. Id. Looking at present utilization patterns in different HMOs,
these researchers estimate how many people would have to enroll in the HMO to allow this
essential group of providers to work at maximum efficiency. Id. at 149-50. After concluding that
1.2 million people would be necessary to support three independent plans, they found that only
42% of the American population actually live in such regions. Id. at 150. The ability to generalize
from these findings must be understood within the context in which the data were collected and
analyzed. Since utilization patterns were based on staff HMO utilization, providers within a group
HMO or IPA HMO might be able to reach maximum efficiency at a lower number of enrollees
through their ability to generate revenue from other financing sources. Though this study
limitation indicates that 1.2 million people might represent a number larger than necessary to
achieve efficiencies, there is another limitation that counterbalances this first limitation. The 1.2
million figure would hold true if every member of the community belonged to an HMO. Thus in
an actual community where people are financed through many different sources such as BC0BS or
Medicare, the 1.2 million figure would need to be much higher to account for the fact that only a
percentage of the population is covered under some type of HMO plan. As the two limitations
counterbalance each other, perhaps the figure of 1.2 million is nearly accurate.
207. As already discussed, only 42% of the country lives in an area where three mutually
exclusive plans can be supported. Kronick et al., supra note 206, at 150. Thus, in 58% of the
health care markets, exclusionary contracts could lead to detrimental foreclosure.
208. Kronick et al., found that if there are only 360,000 people in an area, the plans in the
region already would have to share some hospital facilities and contract for tertiary services. Id.
For a region with 180,000 people, the plans would even need to share such specialized services as
cardiology and urology. Id.
From this study, it becomes apparent that many specialized health care resources are
essential facilities for HMOs entering into most markets. Yet the Marshfield court declined to
apply this doctrine, primarily because of it failed to find an HMO submarket. Marshfield, 65 F.3d
at 1413. In deciding the issue this way, the circuit court reversed the district court's denial of
Marshfield's motion for judgment as a matter of law on this point. 883 F. Supp. at 1255. The
lower court, quoting MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081,
1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 234 (1983), stated that the record showed that
BCIBS had proved: "(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's
inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the
facility to a competitor, and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility."
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a community.
3. Regulatory Environment
Since government regulatory activities can impose formi-
dable barriers to entry, the NAAG states that it will look at the
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the interaction
between a firm's behavior and its regulatory environment.'
The health care industry is heavily regulated at both the nation-
al and state levels. Once regulatory barriers are erected, an
HMO imposing exclusionary restraints upon a group of provid-
ers can attain long-term supracompetitive profits because of the
inability of its competitors to devise creative ways to overcome
their increased costs. Since regulations pose such a significant
anticompetitive danger, the courts should examine carefully the
effects of each.
Certificate of Need (CON) laws have impacted the health
care industry in various ways. Used to prevent the development
of overcapacity within the health care industry by requiring an
entity to obtain a license before building a health care facility,
CON laws often are considered one of the strongest barriers to
entry to health care markets.21° When these laws are in place,
providers may be barred from entry into the market. Thus, an
209. See supra text accompanying note 132.
210. Schramm & Renn, supra note 181, at 881. The federal government originally mandated
that the states develop CON laws in 42 U.S.C. § 300m, however, as part of a wave of
deregulation, these laws were repealed by the Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 3743, 3799. With this move, Congress has returned the power to the
states to decide whether they want to continue these programs.
CON laws only create a barrier because the peculiar economic incentives within some
health care markets allow hospitals to profit from duplicative services. Schramm & Renn, supra
note 181, at 881. Until recently, health care markets have displayed a tendency for capacity to
drive demand. In other words, patients trust their doctors' judgment and undergo treatment if they
suggest it. Confronting suboptimal occupancy, hospitals have put pressure on their doctors to fill
their beds. This phenomenon is known as Roemer's Law, an effect which CON laws were created
to combat. Sylvia A. Law & Barry Ensminger, Negotiating Physicians' Fees: Individual Patients
or Society? (A Case Study in Federalism), 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 17-18 & n.93 (1986). However,
in competitive markets, CON laws are unnecessary because excess supply alone would deter entry
into the market. Schramm & Renn, supra note 181, at 881.
Courts have recognized CON laws as a barrier to entry. See, e.g., United States v.
Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1281-82 (N.D. IIl. 1989), affd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990) (finding CON laws to be one of several barriers); In
re Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361 (1995) (finding a lack of free entry into the Tennessee
and Georgia markets because of CON laws); In re American Med. Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 200-01
(1984) (finding that CON laws posed a formidable obstacle).
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HMO securing an exclusionary right over providers' services
can tie up key resources that will not be replenished by the
entry of new providers.21" ' Though these laws have been in-
strumental in creating barriers in some markets, many states
are now repealing CON laws and thus creating a freer
market.2 2 Where they exist, the courts must analyze carefully
their tendency to erect barriers to entry that prevent the growth
of rival HMOs.
Another area of regulation that could affect entry into the
HMO market is cherry-picking. Cherry-picking refers to the
tendency of some insurers selectively to enroll only healthy
people.2"3 Some states are starting to forbid insurers from en-
gaging in this selection process." 4 When a state does not reg-
ulate the selection of enrollees, a rival HMO can lower its
costs by choosing to insure only healthy groups of people. The
savings achieved from this move can counteract the costs stem-
211. Although CON laws might block providers from entering a market, HMOs stand in a
different position. The original federal CON legislation exempted HMOs from CON requirements
under the following conditions: a) they had to have more than 50,000 enrollees; b) the proposed
facility had to be geographically accessible to the enrollees; and, c) the enrollees had to comprise
at least 75% of the population using the facility. Health Planning and Resources Development
Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-79, § 1527(b)(1)(A), 93 Stat. 592,615 (1979).
With the repeal of federal CON laws, states have modified the conditions under which
they exempt HMOs from CON requirements. See supra note 210. For instance, Maine requires
only that the HMO needs the facility and that it lacks easy access to the facility within the
community. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 309(3) (West 1994). California has enacted somewhat
more stringent requirements, including: a) proof of necessity by the HMO; b) proof of a lack of
availability within the community; and, c) proof that the HMO members will account for 75% of
the facility's utilization. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 437.12(b) (West 1990). Going even
further in this direction, South Dakota bans outright HMO exemptions from CON laws. S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 58-41-14 (1995). As is apparent from this barrage of regulation, HMOs in
most states with CON laws hardly are relieved from the barrier to entry they create.
Even when HMOs easily can escape CON requirements, the CON laws still can impose
formidable barriers. Although a new HMO might be allowed to purchase equipment for the
providers with whom it contracts, an anticompetitive HMO can gain a significant cost advantage
by entering into exclusive contracts with providers who already have all the necessary CONs.
Thus it does not have to expend resources on accumulating new facilities and equipment for its
providers, which lowers its costs relative to its competitors who make these expenditures. As long
as the provider market lacks total freedom in the accumulation of facilities, an anticompetitive
HMO easily can impose costs on its rivals.
212. Baker, supra note 164, at 97. This change in the law partially might be a response to the
increasingly greater influence of managed care on many health care delivery markets in
controlling overutilization. See infra note 328 (discussing the significant HMO penetration of
various markets).
213. Paul Carson, State Law to Put Brakes on Health Insurance Cherry-Picking, S. FLA.
Bus. J., Aug. 10, 1992, at 19.
214. See id. (stating that Florida has passed a law forbidding discrimination against small
employers).
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ming from foreclosure of key provider resources to some de-
gree. However, the rival HMO can succeed only if the
anticompetitive HMO is not already charging rates that vary
with the health of the consumers. Thus, courts ought to investi-
gate state laws concerning cherry-picking as well as the rate-
making practices of the anticompetitive HMO to determine
how much of a barrier such regulation imposes on a rival
IMO trying to gain a share of the market.
Whereas some regulation facilitates the perpetration of
antitrust injury by reinforcing barriers to entry, other regulation
facilitates such injury by making it unassailable in the courts.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the business of insurance
from federal regulation." 5 Yet this exemption has been inter-
preted narrowly to mean the "spreading and underwriting of a
policyholder's risk."2 '6 The imposition of vertical restraints
upon providers exceeds the exemption for mostly actuarial
functions, therefore, these relationships probably still will be
subject to antitrust scrutiny." 7 Thus although the exemption
argument likely will be raised in many cases, precedent sup-
ports dismissal of this defense.
Similar to the McCarran-Ferguson defense, a defendant
HMO might assert its qualification for a state action exemption
from antitrust laws. Immunity could arise from the state's di-
rect supervision of insurance rates." 8 Even if the HMO's
rates are set by the state, however, it would never order the
HMO to enter into exclusionary agreements with providers.
Since these activities inevitably will raise insurance costs in
215. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(1976).
216. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979).
217. See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1403 (D.Kan. 1987), affd
in part and remanded in part, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990)
(finding that the ramifications of BC/BS's financing of managed care activities extend too far into
the provider market to qualify for the exemption when faced with allegations of anticompetitive
behavior).
218. See id. at 1418-19 (describing the elements necessary to qualify for state action
immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), but ultimately finding that the Office of
the Insurance Commissioner had little effect on the conduct of BC!BS's business). Cf.
Westchester Radiological Assoc. v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 707 F. Supp. 708, 714
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), affid, 884 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1095 (1990) (noting
that the state's regulation of BCYBS's rate-setting mechanism was an important factor in its
dismissal of this antitrust suit although it did not conclusively bestow state action immunity upon
BCBS for its provider payment policies).
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contravention of the state's rate regulation policies, the state
actually has a strong interest in deterring such behavior. Thus,
state action immunity is not likely to play a major role in most
cases where an HMO has attempted to raise its rivals' costs.
4. Capacity
Now that the states are repealing CON laws, the competi-
tive market is starting to create similar incentives to avoid
overcapacity. If a group of hospital promoters believes that a
market is saturated, it might choose not to enter it. Hospital
promoters would fear financial loss because overcapacity could
lead to weak bargaining power." Even if rival HMOs tried
to persuade new hospitals to enter the market to compensate
for the artificial scarcity created by the anticompetitive HMO,
the hospitals probably would resist. They might contemplate
that the exclusive agreement creating the artificial scarcity
eventually would end and decrease the hospitals' bargaining
position resulting from overcapacity. Thus, hospital market
dynamics can act as a barrier to entry, thereby preventing the
expansion of rival HMOs.
5. Nature of competitors
Even if an HMO has deterred entry of most competitors
through its exclusionary restraints, there are still conditions un-
der which it might be vulnerable to competition. An HMO that
has successfully raised its rivals' costs still faces competition
from an insurer who can withstand a short term loss with the
goal of achieving a long term gain. For example, if BC/BS
decides to break into the HMO industry in an area where an
anticompetitive HMO has exacted an exclusionary right over
various providers, it can bear the temporary loss associated
with the artificial scarcity created by the agreement.' A
219. Cf Melnick et al., supra note 180, at 227 (explaining that a hospital has increased
bargaining power when both the hospital and the health care market have little excess capacity).
220. In Ohio, for instance, BC/BS of Ohio [hereinafter BCBSO] has monetary reserves of
$281.9 million, which it can access in entering a new financing product market. 1993 Balance
Sheet, BCBSO, Winter 1995, at back cover. This amount compares favorably to many HMOs in
the area. For example, Physicians Health Plan of Ohio, Inc., operates on a net income of $21.1
million. Largest Health Maintenance Organizations, CRAIN's CLEVELA4D Bus., Dec. 26,1994, at
56. This amounts to only a tenth of BCBSO's reserves. Thus, BCBSO could sustain several years
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company like BC/BS also has the necessary goodwill to foster
trust among consumers, employers, and providersY This
would facilitate its development of both a provider and con-
sumer base. Ultimately, it could succeed in attracting enrollees
who previously had no choice but to enroll in the HMO em-
ploying the vertical restraint. Thus, it would reintroduce price
competition into the market. After the term of the exclusionary
contract expired, the providers likely would refuse to enter into
another similar agreement because of the potential to benefit
from working with both HMOs. Subsequently, the HMOs
would earn only competitive profits as opposed to monopolis-
tic, supracompetitive profits. For this scenario to occur, an
insurer must be willing to risk a temporary loss, and the pro-
viders outside of the restraint must be able to service enough
of the population to produce a viable HMO. Otherwise, the
anticompetitive HMO would be able to continue to reap
supracompetitive profits. Even if these conditions are met, a
court might find that a sufficient number of potential competi-
tors have been barred from entry to qualify the behavior as an
antitrust violation.
The nature of competing providers also can affect the
degree to which an HMO's anticompetitive strategy attains
success. Where there is sufficient residual provider capacity
after the vertical restraint results in foreclosure of a significant
portion of the market, other providers may not be feasible
candidates for joining HMO networks. If the other providers
are non-profit organizations, they might prefer not to enter into
a capitated agreement with an HMO, which would force them
to engage in price competition. Rather, they might prioritize
the acquisition of high-tech equipment or highly trained per-
sonnel to more cost effective treatment that would allow them
to compete along price lines.m Thus, they might not be ap-
of losses if it were to compete with Physicians Health Plan in a market where Physicians Health
Plan had engaged in exclusionary behavior.
221. Cf supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing the role of goodwill in new
physician practices).
222. Sunny G. Yoder, Appendix to Chapter 1, in FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE
19, 22 (Bradford H. Gray, ed. 1986). The author argues that the prestige stemming from state-of-
the-art technology inures to the benefit of managers in a manner similar to profits in a for-profit
organization. Id. The author also postulates that only for-profit organizations can limit this behav-
ior of non-profits by engaging in price competition. Id. However, when a rival hospital's output is
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propriate partners for a rival HMO. Sometimes these non-profit
hospitals lose their ability to compete because their mission
stipulates that they are devoted to serving the indigent. Conse-
quently, they develop reputations as second-rate caregivers and
become unqualified to compete with the hospitals offered by
the anticompetitive HMO.m Courts should not consider hos-
pitals that do not act competitively to be part of the provider
market when analyzing the extent to which rivals effectively
can contract with other providers to overcome the increased
costs imposed by the HMO with exclusionary restraints.
D. Actual Effect on Output and Consumer Choice
Once the restraint has been in place for some time, its
effects can be measured directly. In their assessment of anti-
trust violations, the DOJ, FTC, and the NAAG take into con-
sideration the actual effects on both output and consumer
choice. 4  When evaluating the effects of an HMO's
exclusionary right over a provider's services, one can compare
the numbers of enrollees in rival ]HMOs' plans with the num-
ber of enrollees in similar plans in other locations with compa-
rable demographic data. If the HMO's output, that is, its en-
rollment level, is lower than expected, a court might conclude
that the market's exclusionary restraint has created
anticompetitive effects. Similarly, if an area has fewer choices
of HMO financing packages than other areas with comparable
demographics, a court might infer antitrust injury stemming
from the exclusionary behavior. Yet courts should be wary of
the value of such data because of the likelihood of intervening
variables.
controlled by an HMO charging monopolistic prices, price competition does not exist. Cf
Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 807 F.2d 1381, 1390 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding
that non-profit hospitals were not an effective check on for-profit hospitals' collusive practices).
223. See Melnick et al., supra note 180, at 229 (discussing how hospitals that primarily
serve indigent patients create a distortion in the HHI concentration index because they do not
compete effectively for privately insured patients).
224. Supra notes 130, 131, 136 and accompanying text. Through their investigation of the
quality and range of services offered by competing networks, the DOJ and F'TC principles neces-
sarily lead to a consideration of output and choice.
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E. Evaluation of Legal Precedent Examining the Raising of
Rival HMO Costs Through Exclusionary Restraints
Once a court has considered all the factors indicating whe-
ther the nature of consumer demand, the HMO's conduct, and
the market's structure create the conditions necessary to raise
rivals' costs successfully through exclusionary restraints on
providers, it can make a clear judgment about the likelihood of
anticompetitive effects. Though the U.S. Healthcare court
might have determined correctly that the minimal nature of the
length of the agreement in question, as well as the lack of
rigidity of the restraint involved, militated against finding a
significant increase in costs to rivals, there might have been
other persuasive evidence of anticompetitive tendencies. Absent
inquiry into other aspects of the agreement or the provider and
consumer markets, it is impossible to tell how accurately the
court understood the dynamics of the restraint under investiga-
tion. In accordance with the standards for examining
anticompetitive effects set up by the common law and govern-
ment agencies, a court should examine thoroughly consumer
preferences, exclusionary conduct, and economic influences
that affect health care markets before deciding whether an
exclusive agreement between an HMO and a group of provid-
ers creates mostly efficiencies or inefficiencies.
Whereas the U.S. Healthcare court did not structure its
opinion in a manner that would elucidate any anticompetitive
effects of the exclusionary restraint under examination, the
Marshfield court's reasoning more closely adhered to formal
antitrust analysis. Yet many of the court's findings discord
with the present body of research into health care industry
dynamics. In examining the health care financing market, the
court declined to recognize any distinct HMO characteristics
and labeled it a mere method of pricing services. 5 Yet most
225. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1409 (7th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1288 (1996). Instead of finding attractive, non-price qualities of HMOs, the
court asserts that many consumers likely would switch to FFS-type insurance because they are not
attracted to the incentives created within HMOs. Id. at 1410. Yet this statement seems somewhat
contradictory with the court's finding a high rate of return for Marshfield. Id. at 1411. The court
does not explain how Marshfield ever could have sustained a high rate of return when consumers
only chose the HMO for its price and likely would switch to FFS insurance with even a small
increase above the HMO's competitive price because of their distaste for HMO incentives.
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studies of consumer demand indicate that consumers are start-
ing to enroll in HMO plans largely for non-price reasons.'
The court also refused to accept DRGs as evidence of different
provider products with separate geographic markets. 7 Al-
though the court recognized that only primary care was deliv-
ered locally, it made no indication of what kinds of evidence
would serve to delineate secondary and tertiary care mar-
kets.' Yet health care industry experts strongly assert that
these markets are different from primary care markets. 9 Af-
ter its examination of consumer demand, the court discussed
potential barriers to entry." In denying that Marshfield doc-
tors could be considered an essential facility primarily because
of a lack of an HMO submarket, the court also stated that
competition among providers would not help consumers."
The focus on provider competition is erroneous; rather, the
court should have been focused on HMO competition. Had it
been looking at this tier of the market, it would have realized
that it should have been examining the providers in the region
to determine if BC/BS still could develop a minimum efficient
scale of operations with the doctors not under Marshfield's
control. 2 The court also should have attempted to quantify
the costs imposed upon BC/BS due to Marshfield's discourag-
ing its doctors from cross-covering for independent physicians
and its hospitals from entering into contracts with rival
HMOs. 3 The costs of establishing alternative provider net-
works could be insurmountable even for a strong health care
financing agent." Thus even though the Marshfield court ap-
226. See supra part IV.A.l.a.
227. Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1411.
228. Id.
229. See supra part IV.A.2.b.
230. Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1412. The court did not address the degree of foreclosure of
BC/BS from health care facilities in the area, as this Note would suggest doing. See supra part
W.B. Presumably, as employees of Marshfield Clinic, the doctors had either signed a non-
compete clause in an employment contract, or perhaps they simply were aware of how
economically disadvantageous it would be to them as owners of Marshfield to allow a rival HMO
into the market. In either case, the foreclosure from what is at least a major component of the
health care delivery market of the region seemed to have been absolute.
231. Id. at 1413.
232. See supra part IV.C.2.
233. See Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1413 (giving the court's reasoning on this conduct).
234. See supra part IV.C.l.
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plied the correct structure to its analysis, its conclusions indi-
cate that it did not take into account many recent developments
in the health care industry. Other courts examining similar
exclusionary restraints would do well to pay attention to both
the organization and quality of information presented to them
properly to determine whether a restraint rises to the level of
an antitrust violation.
V. INJURY TO CONSUMERS THROUGH CONTROL
OVER PROVIDERS' OUTPUT: ECONOMIC THEORY
In addition to potentially raising rivals' costs, an HMO
might seek to impose exclusionary restraints on a group of pro-
viders to attain monopsonistic control over their prices and
output. This result could occur if the exclusionary relationship
foreclosed the bulk of other potential payors for the providers'
services. Courts ought to examine the dynamics of the rela-
tionships of the parties to each other and to their environment
because the success of this restraint could cause a high degree
of market inefficiency.
When an HMO has monopsonistic power over its sellers,
it creates inefficiencies in the market that would not exist with
perfect competition. 5 In an optimal market, the health care
consumers, HMOs, and providers will negotiate the price of
health care services until an optimal price and quantity, reflect-
ing the relative worth of these services in contrast to all the
other goods and services in society, have been established.'
An HMO within this market continues to consume provider
services until they cost, in the aggregate, as much as the reve-
nue the HMO expects to generate from its enrollment fees. 7
235. Monopsony, the opposite of monopoly, refers to a market where there is only one buyer
of a product. JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 413 (1980).
236. See MIiR & MEINERS, supra note 17, at 36-37 (describing the equilibrium price
where supply meets demand).
237. HIRs-HLEIFE, supra note 235, at 435 (stating that a profit-maximizing firm buys a
factor of production until its marginal factor cost (mfc) equals its marginal revenue product
(mrp)). Marginal factor cost refers to the incremental cost incurred in consuming one more unit of
input. Id. at 415. Within the HMO context, it is the cost of each incremental purchase of health
care services. Marginal revenue product (mrp) refers to the result of multiplying the marginal
product (the incremental yield produced from consuming the last added unit of input) by the
marginal revenue (the revenue associated with the sale of the units produced from the last added
unit). Id. For an HMO, it is the amount of enrollment fees generated by the incremental purchase
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In such a market, an HMO cannot affect the price of the health
care services it consumes by discriminatorily reimbursing the
providers for the services from which it derives the most profit
as opposed to the full range of services that the provider uses
in treating patients. Thus, irrespective of the number of inputs
provided by the providers participating in the HMO and con-
sumed by the enrollees of the HMO, the reimbursement rate
likely remains constant and represents the rate necessary to
cover the whole gamut of services offered by the provider. 8
This homogeneity of the price of services is illustrated in Fig-
ure 3 by the horizontal line, which represents both the total
factor cost (tfc) and the marginal factor cost (mfc)." 9 The
HMO continues to consume health care resources up to the
point where the revenue they produce equals their cost. This
point comes when the cost of the package of provider services,
which is the exact cost of each incremental unit of health care
services, equals the revenue it generates. Unable to generate
separate revenue streams for each individual service a provider
can offer enrollees where the services are only available as an
integrated package, the incremental revenue generated from
consuming provider services necessarily will reflect the reve-
nue of the entire package.' Thus under competitive circum-
stances, the HMO consumes packages of provider services until
the revenue they generate as a package equals their cost.
of the provision of services. The relationship between mfc and mrp is illustrated in figure three.
238. Cf. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 235, at 415 (discussing the inability of a firm in a
competitive market to affect its average factor cost through the quantity it consumes).
239. The total factor cost (Qfc) refers to the total cost of all the separate components of a
provider's delivery of health care services that comprise the total delivery. As each incremental
purchase of health care services consists of the same full package of services offered by the
provider, the mfc equals the t'c.
240. This effect is shown in figure three through the identical nature of the mrp and total
revenue product (trp) curves. trp refers to the summation of the revenues generated by each
component of the package of health care services offered by providers. Since the components are
sold in a standard package in competitive circumstances, tirp equals mrp. Thus these two curves
coincide in figure 3.
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When an HMO extracts an exclusionary agreement from
the providers that prevents them from dealing with other
HMOs, it may succeed in foreclosing many other potential
payors for the providers' services.24 This monopsonistic
power would mean that the HMO could control the price of the
services it buys by specifying which services it will allow the
providers to give its enrollees. To maximize profits, the HMO
would allow the providers to perform only services that are
241. Though one might wonder why physicians ever would want to sacrifice their ability to
sell their services to whomever they wanted, many believe that they have no choice. As managed
care penetrates deeper into the health care financing market, many physicians will have to enter
some groups or they will risk losing all their patients. Jerome P. Kassirer, Access to Specialty
Care, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1151, 1151 (1994). Combined with this heavy network formation,
providers in some markets can experience decreased bargaining power because of excess capacity
in their market that forces them to engage in drastic measures to attract patients. See supra note
219 and accompanying text (discussing capacity as a barrier to entry into the provider market); but
see supra note 222 and accompanying text (noting that excess capacity does not mean weakened
bargaining power when the excess capacity exists among non-profit hospitals that are not
competing for patients along price lines). The problem of excess capacity also could be
exacerbated by low concentration in the provider market. See supra part IV.B.l.b (describing the
relevance of provider concentration in negotiations between insurers and providers). Though
providers might make seemingly unreasonable sacrifices in response to these environmental
factors, they might be choosing the only possible way to continue practicing at all.
Even if the arrangement providers enter into does not seem unreasonable initially, it might
become so later as the balance of power within the relationship changes. Once 65% of its patient
base came from PruCare, Austin Regional Clinic in Austin, Texas developed difficulties fighting
to retain control under its exclusionary arrangement with this insurer. Johnsson, supra note 27, at
23. The doctors in the clinic suggest that some of the problems that might arise in an exclusionary
agreement include issues about utilization review and quality assurance. Id. at 24. By controlling
these aspects of physicians' practices, the HMO essentially is controlling their output.
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likely to generate more revenue than cost,2 and thus the pro-
viders no longer would receive reimbursement for the entire
packages of services they usually offer their patients. Realizing
great savings from its control, the monopsonistic HMO would
restrict its consumption of health care resources to a point
below the competitive level, as shown in figure four.243 By
offering fewer provider services, the HMO produces a policy
with suboptimal features.2" Hence, despite the HMO's cost
savings, enrollees and providers do not interact to the same ex-
tent they would in a competitive environment.
242. See generally Michael L. Ie, When Health Care Payers Have Market Power, 263
JAMA 1981, 1981 (1990) (stating that monopsonists only buy an input when its marginal cost is
greater than its marginal revenue).
243. Whereas an HMO in a competitive market would consume to q*, the monopsonistic
HMO only consumes to q'.
244. When a monopsonistic HMO starts to restrain the amount of services it purchases, it
might cause patients to receive less attention from the doctor per visit, longer waiting times, fewer
amenities at the hospital, etc. Pauly, Competition, supra note 200, at 260.
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An HMO likely would engage in this kind of exclusionary
practice if it estimated that the costs of obtaining the conces-
sion would be less than the monopsonistic profits it could gar-
ner.245 The HMO could succeed in its anticompetitive strategy
only by blocking the providers' access to a significant number
of other payors. To achieve this goal, the HMO first must con-
sume a large portion of the providers' services itself, which
would foster the providers' reliance on the HMO.2" This reli-
245. As the imposition of an exclusionary restraint also can lead to the raising of rivals'
costs, an HMO probably weighs the costs of the restraint against the benefits to be achieved from
both sources when deciding whether to engage in this anticompetitive behavior. See Susan E. Fos-
ter, Monopsony and Backward Integration: Section 2 Violations in the Buyer's Market, 11 U.
PUGEr SouND L. REv. 687,708 (1988) (raising the need to examine the incentives created by the
ability to raise rivals' costs in addition to the ability to achieve monopsonistic rents when
considering exclusionary activities).
246. Cf. PILIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, 4 ANTrrRUST LAw 963 (1980) (arguing
that a horizontal merger between two buyers could create anticompetitive, monopsonistic purchas-
ing power only when the merging parties together account for at least 25% of the purchasing
market share).
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ance would allow the HMO to keep its provider expenses low
by dictating the level of service offered by the providers to its
enrollees. This reliance would be reinforced if the providers
operated in an environment that consisted primarily of HMO-
financed health care. In this situation, the terms of their exclu-
sive contract would prevent the providers from finding a sig-
nificant number of other payors. Without other payors to help
defray the costs of providing optimal care, the monopsonistic
HMO could refuse to pay the providers enough to develop the
ability to provide an acceptable range of services.247 Further-
more, there must be significant barriers to entry for non-HMO
providers into the market.2" This market condition would
prevent deterioration of the monopsonistic HMO's control over
its provider group.
In summary, the HMO could achieve monopsonistic power
through an exclusionary restraint if: i) it consumes a significant
amount of the providers' services; ii) there are few non-HMO
health care financing options in the market; and, iii) there are
significant barriers to entry for non-HMO financed health
care.249 When all of these elements are present, an HMO like-
247. Cf RicHARD A. POSNER, ANTrrRusT CASES, ECONOMIC NoTES, AND OThER
MATERIAlS 376 (1974) (stating that a monopolist's large market share is insignificant if competi-
tors easily can expand production and return the price to its optimal level). Within the reverse
context of a monopsony market, the strength of a monopsonistic purchaser with a large share of
the sellers' output is insignificant if other purchasers easily can expand consumption and return
the level of output and its price to its optimal state.
248. Cf. id. at 337 (discussing ease of entry into a market of new producers as limiting
monopolistic behavior). For a monopsonist, therefore, ease of entry of new buyers could inhibit
monopsonistic behavior.
249. These factors could pose a danger for many different providers. For instance, an
obstetrics group practice might derive 80% of its income from an HMO with an exclusionary
restraint, preventing the group from contracting with other HMOs. Because it would not be
feasible to invest money in resources for which the HMO does not intend to reimburse the
providers, they likely would avoid acquiring an MRI to scan women with problem pregnancies
without a commitment from the HMO to reimburse them for its use. Even if most obstetric group
practices serving other HMOs used MRIs, the monopsonistic conditions would force the group
under the restraint to forego providing this optimal level of care. This power would be reinforced
if there was heavy HMO penetration of the market. Perhaps the market consists of 50% HMO
enrollees, 25% Medicare, and 25% FFS insurance. The obstetricians would find it difficult to in-
crease the amount of services they provided outside the HMO because their exclusionary contract
prevents them from working with 50% of the market Since Medicare patients do not usually
require obstetric services due to their age, the obstetricians would have access only to the
remaining 25% of the market to compensate for any refusal by the HMO to reimburse them for
services they would ideally provide. If the obstetricians tried to encourage entry into the market
by a non-HMO network, such as a PPO, perhaps startup costs and other barriers would make the
development of this system untenable. Hence the monopsonistic HMO would find it had total
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ly would reduce the types of provider services it would buy to
achieve its own cost savings.
Such HMO practice could lead to various inefficiencies in
the market. The consumers would be deprived of optimal out-
put.' Though the monopsonistic HMO would experience
lower costs for provider services, it would not pass on these
savings to its enrollees."' Rather, the enrollees would pay the
same amount for enrollment in a monopsonistic HMO as they
would for enrollment in a competitive HMO with similar fea-
tures, even if the competitive HMO had higher costs."
Hence, the monopsonistic HMO would not compensate its
enrollees for its lower than optimal quantity of services by
charging lower than market prices.
The providers also would experience welfare loss as a
result of this arrangement. Though they would receive compen-
sation for a full range of services in a competitive environ-
ment, the monopsonistic HMO would purchase only a portion
of such services. The HMO's exclusionary restraint could de-
prive the providers of a significant source of income.
Despite the potential for some production efficiencies to
offset the allocative inefficiencies, 3 this relationship also
would breed production and innovation inefficiencies." One
control over the delivery and pricing of the obstetrics group practice.
250. Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CoRNELL L.
REv. 297, 305 (1991). In addition to the examples stated supra note 244, another salient example
of the reduction of output among HMOs is the decreasing length of hospital stay (LOS). Some of
the better studies in this area have indicated that HMOs have 14% shorter LOS than indemnity
plans. Miller & Luft, supra note 153, at 1514. Yet it is questionable whether the consumer
actually benefits from a shorter LOS. One study found that a reduction in LOS leads to a greater
length of absence from work and a resulting higher expense to the company that more than offsets
the reduced LOS's savings. J.B. Silvers, Variation in Inpatient Cost & Net Corporate Value by
DRG 9 (1992) (unpublished manuscript). Thus savings achieved through shorter LOS sometimes
increase overall costs. This tendency to reduce optimal output will only be reinforced by
monopsonistic power over provider services, and the present suboptimal output even could be
indicative of a degree of pervasive monopsonistic power that HMOs already possess.
251. See, e.g., Damon Braly, HMOs Increase Profits by Cutting Medical Loss Ratios,
Managed Care Report Finds, HEALTH INDUSTRY TODAY, Jan. 1993, at 21 (stating that HMO
profits have increased because their medical expenses have decreased relative to their revenues).
Thus HMOs already are displaying a tendency to accumulate profits rather than decrease
premiums when they save on provider services.
252. See Blair & Harrison, supra note 250, at 305 (asserting that since other competitors
would not have the same monopsonistic advantage, the monopsonist could charge this market
price and still retain its consumers).
253. Supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (describing the significance of the
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production loss stems from the money spent entertaining doc-
tors and hospital management initially to entice them to enter
into the agreement and to persuade them to remain in the rela-
tionship. This increases the cost of producing services, but does
not increase the quality or quantity of the final product.
Moreover, a monopsonist HMO would not be able to in-
duce the providers to develop cheaper production methods
because the providers would realize that the HMO might dis-
cover their lower costs and demand lower prices for their ser-
vices. There would be no increase in production efficiency in
this relationship. Likewise, the providers would not endeavor to
create innovative treatment techniques if they believed the
benefits would inure only to the HMO. Innovation efficiency,
therefore, would be stifled." As a result of these ineffi-
ciencies, an HMO that gained monopsonistic power through its
exclusionary restraints would create mostly harm with long-
term effects to the health care market in which it operates.
VI. INJURY TO CONSUMERS THROUGH CONTROL
OF PROVIDERS' OUTPUT: LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
Although monopsonistic buying power resulting from
exclusionary restraints on sellers poses a clear threat of anti-
trust injury, courts have not developed a substantial body of
case law regarding this issue. Irrespective of the source of
monopsonistic power, through exclusionary restraints or other-
wise, monopsony has not developed into a cohesive common
law cause of action. Currently, courts examine each case in-
volving monopsony in the context of another, established anti-
trust cause of action. Yet even within these established causes
of action, there are conflicting judicial interpretations of the
law. As a result, no set of elements can lead definitively to
liability for an antitrust injury stemming from monopsonistic
buying power. Although some courts have interpreted the law
various types of inefficiencies).
255. Cf Robert E. Bloch & Donald M. Falk, Antitrust, Competition, and Health Care
Reform, in HEALTH CARE REFORM AND ANTITRUsT 1994, 9, 16 (PLI Com. L. & Prac. Course
Handbook Series No. 694, 1994) (stating that Clinton's proposed health alliance purchasers would
have monopsony power that would discourage providers from being innovative in their medical
care).
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in a way that overlooks potentially monopsonistic market con-
ditions, 56 others have created precedent that better accords
with economic realities. 7 However, no court has applied
such insightful analysis to a market in which exclusionary re-
straints have led to monopsonistic buying power.
Although the Supreme Court has not developed a separate
body of antitrust law around the concept of monopsony, in
deciding Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sug-
ar," it recognized that monopsony violates the public policy
considerations addressed by the Sherman Act. In Mandeville,
sugar refiners who controlled the only market for California
sugar beets agreed to adopt uniform pricing for their beets. 9
Since one of the farms would have achieved higher prices in
the absence of the agreement, it sued the refiners for the conse-
quent economic injury.' After stating that the Sherman Act
allowed sellers as well as consumers to sue for treble damag-
es," the Court determined that this arrangement led to
anticompetitive control over the quantity and price of the goods
offered by the farmers. 2 The Court also determined that this
arrangement harmed competition in the final product
market.263
Although this case seems to lend unqualified support to
the notion that sellers are statutorily protected from monopso-
nistic buying practices, the Court analyzed the refiners' con-
duct as collusive price-fixing and cited cases that establish the
per se illegality of this offense.' Thus, cases that do not in-
volve collusion can be distinguished on these grounds.'
Mandeville does not stand for the proposition that monopsonis-
tic buying practices, including those that arise from
256. See infra part VI. (discussing the Kartell, Ocean States, and Westchester Radiological
cases).
257. See infra part VI (discussing the Ball Memorial and Reazin cases).
258. 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
259. Id. at 223.
260. Id. at 224.
261. Id. at 235.
262. Id. at 240-41.
263. Id. at 241.
264. Id. at 235.
265. However, when collusion is involved, the DOJ and the FfC have stated that they will
challenge such a relationship in the event that it leads to monopsonistic purchasing power. 1992
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41,553.
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exclusionary restraints, clearly are illegal, but provides limited
support for such a finding.
Although the bulk of cases considering monopsonistic
purchasing practices are neither Supreme Court cases nor cases
involving exclusionary restraints, there are cases that examine
monopsony in various health care contexts. A court considering
potential monopsonistic control by an HMO over providers
through an exclusionary restraint can apply the reasoning of
those courts. However, highly inconsistent views have been
proffered that could lead to inconsistent results from future
courts looking at exclusionary restraints.
In Kartell v. Blue Shield,' the court considered whether
Blue Shield's ban on physician balanced billing constituted an
antitrust violation. 7 Overturning the district court, the First
Circuit reasoned that no restraint of trade was possible when
Blue Shield is regarded as a buyer of services as opposed to "a
'third force', intervening in the marketplace in a manner that
prevents willing buyers and sellers from independently coming
together to strike price/quality bargains."" 8  Thus, the buyer
and seller ought to be allowed to determine for themselves
what the price and characteristics of the product should be
without the intervention of antitrust law. 9 The doctors ar-
gued, however, that one important fact was the market power
of Blue Shield.27 In dictum, the court considered this argu-
ment but gave it less weight than Blue Shield's
counterargument that its arrangements neither caused the doc-
tors to forfeit opportunities to treat patients with other insur-
ance nor evidenced any sign of lower output.2 1 Further, the
266. 749 F.2d 922 (lst Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985).
267. Id. at 923. Balance billing refers to the practice of making additional charges to patients
above the reimbursement rate by the insurer. The antitrust injury that the court is supposedly
examining is a Sherman Act § 1 agreement in restraint of trade. Id. at 924.
268. Id. at 924. Absent a restraint of trade, the doctors could not prove a Sherman § I
violation.
269. Id. at 925. The court distinguished Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948), by calling it a case of a 'sham' organization whose sole purpose
was to combine for an anticompetitive purpose. Id.
270. Kartell, 749 F.2d at 926. Market power, which is a factor in monopoly power, also is an
essential element for proving a Sherman § 2 violation. See infra text accompanying note 281
(discussing the Ocean State court's enumeration of the elements of a monopolization cause of
action).
271. Kartell, 749 F.2d at 927.
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court found that the alleged harm of subcompetitive pricing did
not constitute an antitrust injury, even if Blue Shield had mar-
ket power. 2  Despite many public policy considerations prof-
fered by the doctors,273 the court held that the buyer may
choose the goods it buys and the price it pays.274 With this
opinion, the court greatly hinders the ability of providers to
raise monopsony as a viable cause of action when suffering
anticompetitive losses under an exclusionary restraint.
In deciding Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield,275 the same court had another op-
portunity to evaluate monopsony in the health care industry. In
this case, BC/BS established a most favored nations payment
plan in which it informed doctors that they must certify that
they are not accepting lower fees from any other insurer.276 If
they did, BC/BS would lower their rates by twenty percent.27
BC/BS instituted this policy in response to the establishment of
Ocean State, an IPA HMO that was trying to develop incen-
tives for physicians to keep costs down by withholding twenty
percent of physicians' fees. If a profit was realized, Ocean
State intended to return a part of the withheld portion.27 Up-
on implementation of the BC/BS policy, almost a third of the
Ocean State doctors resigned, ostensibly to avoid BC/BS's
payment reductions.279 Ocean State and many participating
doctors instituted a Sherman section 2 suit against BC/BS
claiming that this policy was aimed at inducing physicians to
leave Ocean State.o
There are two elements to establish a Sherman section 2
monopolization violation: "(1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
272. Id.
273. Id. at 929. Some of these rationales dealt with various inefficiencies stemming from
Blue Shield's purchasing policy. For instance, the doctors suggested that they had no incentive to
experiment with new, expensive outpatient technology that actually might lower overall medical
costs. This results in innovation inefficiency. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
274. Kartell, 749 F.2d at 929.
275. 883 F.2d 1101 (lst Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
276. Id. at 1103.
277. Id. at 1104.
278. Id.
279. Id. Arguably, most favored nations clauses can be viewed as exclusionary restraints in
that they deter providers from entering into competitive relationships with other financing agents.
280. Id.
[Vol. 6:391
1996] UNBRIDLED MANAGED CARE 455
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident." 1 Since BCBS did not dispute
that it had monopoly power, the court proceeded to decide
whether it had unlawfully maintained this power.2 Although
it recognized that exclusionary conduct could be
anticompetitive, 3 the court reasoned that paying the same
amount for the same service is the essence of true competi-
tion." Focusing solely on the desire to achieve low prices as
a legitimate business justification, 5 the court stated that even
a demonstrated intent to crush its rivals did not supersede the
presumed lawfulness of BC/BS's act. 6 Hence, it appears that
the court would allow any anticompetitive activity provided
that there is some business justification. Through this holding,
281. Id. at 1110 (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,570-71 (1966)).
282. Id.
283. Id. (defining exclusionary conduct as going "beyond the needs of ordinary business
dealings, beyond the ambit of ordinary business skill, and 'unnecessarily excludling]
competition"' (quoting Barry Wright Corp. v. iTT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 230 (1st Cir.
1983)).
284. Ocean State, 883 F.2d at 1110 (quoting the lower court's opinion). Though this court
finds HMO health care delivery to be the same service as FFS delivery, other courts might find
delivery within a cost containment environment to be a significantly different product. See supra
part IV.A.L.a (discussing the perceptions and behavior patterns of health care consumers as proof
of the disparate nature of these two services).
285. In a footnote, the court states that it is irrelevant that the savings are not being passed
along to the customers. Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 883
F.2d 1101, 1111 n.1 1(1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990). Thus even if the physi-
cians are producing less output because of the monopsonistic purchasing arrangement, the court
evidences indifference to whether the insurer compensates the consumers for this allocative
inefficiency through lower prices. This lack of concern for the effects of inefficiency on
consumers goes against the basic policy considerations underlying the antitrust laws.
The court also mentions the possibility that what ordinarily might be deemed competitive
conduct could be illegal if taken by a monopolist because of its tendency to destroy competition.
Id. at 1112 (quoting Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274-75 (2d Cir.
1979)). Yet the court qualifies this assertion by accepting such illegal conduct as long as the
monopolist acts for "valid business reasons." Id. (distinguishing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608 (1985) on the grounds that no efficiency justification
was offered in that case). The court seems to have misunderstood the meaning of Aspen Skiing.
The Supreme Court did not intend to make the lack of a legitimate business reason a sine qua non
of a § 2 cause of action. Rather, it was one factor to be considered in finding a specific intent to
injure rivals. 472 U.S. at 608. Even if there is a legitimate business reason, the Court would allow
anticompetitive statements made by officers of a corporation to satisfy the specific intent element.
Id. at 608 n.39. Thus the Ocean State case may well have had a different outcome in the hands of
the Supreme Court. See Ocean State, 883 F.2d at 1112 (describing statements made by a BCIBS
executive about Ocean State).
286. Id. (stating that evidence of the intention of BC/BS's president to 'emasculate' Ocean
State was insignificant).
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the court has significantly strengthened its Kartell position and
has created even greater obstacles for providers in bringing a
monopsonistic cause of action when experiencing antitrust loss
under an exclusionary restraint.
Other courts have reasoned similarly when presented with
the possibility of monopsonistic purchasing power over health
care providers. In Westchester Radiological Associates v. Em-
pire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 7 the court examined an
arrangement between BC/BS and the hospitals from whom it
bought services in which BC/BS insisted that the hospitals
provide radiological services as part of a package. 8 As a re-
sult of this arrangement, radiologists no longer could bill pa-
tients directly and suffered a substantial financial loss. 9 Af-
ter dismissing the radiologists' claim of a Sherman section 1
violation,' the court went on to consider the section 2 viola-
tion.
Although the evidence did not clearly show Blue Cross's
market power, the court assumed that this element was
satisfied.29' Rather than examining potentially predatory con-
duct by a monopolist,2' the court looked at the Kartell
court's reasoning and decided that even buyers with market
power have an unqualified right to use their power to negotiate
a good price.293 Yet the court failed to mention that the pri-
mary reason for the Kartell decision was the lack of evidence
of an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Sherman
section 1.294 By extending this holding to Sherman section 2
claims, the court implied that the elements of a monopolization
287. 707 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 884 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1095 (1990).
288. ld.at710.
289. Id. at 709.
290. Id. at 714.
291. Id. at 714-15. In examining market power, the court looked at both the percentage of
hospital revenues attributable to BCIBS as well as the percentage of the patient market enrolled in
BCIBS. Id. at 715 n.19. These two figures are imperative to understanding the potential for
monopsonistic effects. See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text (discussing the
determinants of a successful monopsonistic arrangement).
292. This step would have accorded with the standard analysis of a Sherman § 2 violation.
See supra text accompanying note 281 (defining monopoly within the context of the Ocean State
case).
293. Westchester Radiological, 707 F. Supp. at 715-16.
294. See supra notes 266-74 and accompanying text.
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cause of action never can be satisfied by a monopsonistic pur-
chasing arrangement between health care insurers and provid-
ers.295 If other courts followed this reasoning, they would re-
move even the qualified acceptance of the Ocean State court of
a section 2 violation when the monopsonistic purchaser had no
legitimate business justification. Thus, an exclusionary restraint
imposing hardship on providers always would be upheld.
Although some courts have set precedent firmly against
the recognition of the anticompetitive effects caused by monop-
sonistic insurers under any set of conditions, other courts have
been willing to consider the possible circumstances which
could create such market distortion. In Ball Memorial Hospital,
Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc.,296 an array of hos-
pitals in Indiana sought to enjoin BC/BS from launching a
separate PPO product in addition to its standard FFS prod-
uct.297 Applying a rule of reason analysis, the court stated
that market power was a threshold element.298 Despite
BC/BS's high market share in some markets,2' the court
found no market power" because there were no barriers to
entry into the health care financing market."°  Rather,
295. One public policy reason that the court found important in justifying this outcome is the
need for cost containment in the health care industry. Westchester Radiological Assoc. v. Empire
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 707 F. Supp. 708, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 884 F.2d 707 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1095 (1990). The radiologists asserted that they could claim an extra
$25 million if they billed directly. Id. at 710 n.2. The court subsequently used this figure as
representative of the savings incurred by consumers. Id. at 714. Yet there is no evidence that
BCBS passed on those savings to the consumer or that this arrangement in any way benefitted the
consumer.
296. 784F.2d 1325(7th Cir. 1985).
297. Id. at 1331. The hospitals claimed violations of both Sherman § l and § 2. Id.
298. Id. at 1334.
299. For some of the hospitals, BCBS covered about 80% of the patient population. Id. at
1330. It also accounted for about 50% of all hospital revenues in Indiana. laL This consideration of
both the buyer's market share of the ultimate consumer market and its market share of the
providers' output helps illustrate some of the fundamental sources of monopsony power for the
buyer. See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text (discussing several major factors of
monopsonistic power in an exclusionary relationship).
300. The court defines market power as "the ability to raise price significantly higher than
the competitive level by restricting output." Ball Memorial, 784 F.2d at 1331. This is the mirror
image of monopsonistic power.
301. The circuit court cited approvingly the district court's finding that the relevant product
market is health care financing. Id. Within this market, it found no evidence that Indiana insurance
laws could act as a barrier to other insurers. Id. at 1332.
With the examination of both the consumer market share and the provider market share,
looking at barriers to entry gives the court a full understanding of the range of substitute buyers
that could prevent monopsonistic buying practices of a powerful buyer. See supra notes 245-49
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BC/BS's size indicated merely that it was satisfying its custom-
ers.
Although the court found no market power, it examined
the hospital's assertion of BC/BS's anticompetitive intent.'
The hospitals asked the court to consider an internal memo
circulated in the BC/BS offices that made reference to the need
for a more aggressive stand in demanding lower prices from
providers as proof of this intent. 3 The court, however, did
not find this memo to be dispositive and demanded further
"objective indicators."' "'
Similarly, the court dismissed the hospitals' claim that
BC/BS was raising its rivals' costs by placing the hospitals in a
position where they would have to shift costs to other provid-
ers5 Without market power, the court did not believe that
BC/BS could succeed at this."0 Although ultimately the court
found no antitrust violation, its situation-specific analysis of the
elements that contribute to monopsonistic injury might guide
other courts to be similarly thorough in their analyses when
considering the effects of an exclusionary restraint on provid-
ers.
The court in Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,'
found antitrust violations after a close examination of monop-
sonistic practices not dissimilar to those in Ball Memorial. In
this case, BC/BS attempted to terminate a Wichita hospital's
provider agreement upon discovering that HCA, a for-profit
hospital company, had acquired the hospital in tandem with its
acquisition of a powerful HMO. 8 Concurrent with its ter-
and accompanying text (illustrating the sources of such power stemming from an exclusionary
restraint).
302. Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1337 (7th Cir.
1985). Though monopoly power, as opposed to market power, is a necessary element of a
Sherman § 2 violation, a lack of market power implies a lack of monopoly power, the latter
requiring a higher market share than ordinary market power.
303. Id. Cf Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 883 F.2d
1101, 1113 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990) (describing management's
expression of its desire to destroy its competitor).
304. Ball Memorial, 784 F.2d at 1339. The court also distinguished Mandeville on the basis
of its being illegal per se as a price fixing cartel and required a different standard under § 2 for
single firms such as BCYBS. Id. at 1338.
305. Id. at 1339-40.
306. Il at 1340.
307. 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990).
308. Id. at 958.
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mination decision, BCBS attempted to establish its own inte-
grated network of competing Wichita hospitals. 9 The court
found that BC/BS had market power,3"' citing the percentage
of insureds covered by BC/BS, as well as the percentage of the
plaintiff hospital's revenues attributable to BCBS." The
court stated further that its market power had been reinforced
by various barriers to entry and, therefore, was not merely a
transitory high market share.312
Having found that strong market power constituted mo-
nopoly power, the court also found that BCBS willfully had
maintained its power in violation of Sherman section 2."' In
showing that a well-reasoned analysis can point out the
anticompetitive effects stemming from monopsonistic power,
this court's opinion provides a degree of precedential support
for courts searching for an antitrust injury caused by monopso-
nistic insurers imposing exclusionary restraints on providers.
Although the courts in Ball Memorial and Reazin illustrat-
309. Id. at 960.
310. Id. at 969. The court defined market power as the "power to control prices" or "the
power to exclude competition." Id. at 966 (quoting Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, 796
F.2d 1216, 1225 n.3 (10th Cir. 1986)). The discussion of market power follows the court's
findings that all the other elements of a Sherman § 1 cause of action had been satisfied, namely,
injury, agreement, and unreasonable restraint of trade. Id. at 959-66.
311. Id. at 969. The cited testimony placed the percentage of covered insureds in the range
between 47% and 62%. Id. The percentage of the hospital's revenue coming from BCIBS was
stated to be 18%. Id. at 969 n.26. In the examination of these percentages, the court elucidates two
crucial factors for determining monopsonistic power. See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying
text (discussing the significance to a monopsonistic relationship of both the buyer's consumption
of sellers' output and the buyer's share of the consumer market).
312. Id. at 969-72. The court specifically found significance in BC/BS's historical advantage
in the Kansas market and in the most favored nations clause in its provider contracts. Id. The court
distinguished Ocean State by saying that it was looking at the most favored nations clause from
the perspective of a barrier to entry reinforcing market power as opposed to evidence of
monopolistic behavior under Sherman § 2. Id. at 971 n.30. The court also distinguished Ball
Memorial by saying that the insurance landscapes are different in these different states, and it
disagreed with any part of the Ball Memorial opinion implying that no barrier to the insurance
market ever could exist. Id. at 972 n.32.
This examination of potential new entrants, along with BCBS's market share of both the
supplier and consumer market, illustrates the court's clear recognition of the market forces
necessary to perpetrate an antitrust injury from monopsonistic buying power. See supra notes 245-
49 and accompanying text (discussing the necessary conditions to promote monopsonistic power
in an exclusionary relationship).
313. Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 973 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 497
U.S. 1005 (1990). In a key letter sent to all Kansas hospitals, BCOBS announced, "if hospitals
decide to compete with Blue Cross and Blue Shield in the manner that HCA is competing, Blue
Cross and Blue Shield must make a business decision about its future relationship with these
entities." Id. at 958 n.8.
1996]
HEALTH MATRIX
ed the factors necessary to consider in determining monopsony
power, the U.S. Healthcare court was not compelled to follow
their logic in its examination of an HMO's exclusionary re-
straint over providers. Rather, the disparate court interpretations
of potentially monopsonistic situations gave that court great
latitude regarding the factors to consider in arriving at its judg-
ment. As mentioned above,314 the U.S. Healthcare court de-
cided that there are always too many alternative buyers for
physician services to allow for a monopsonistic environment in
the health care field.315 Therefore, it did not consider any of
the factors that might illustrate that the HMO in this case
wielded monopsony power over its physicians. If other courts
were to regard this holding as persuasive, it could severely
interfere with their probing deeply into the anticompetitive
effects of a monopsonistic purchasing power over a captive
group of providers in an exclusionary relationship.
VII. INFERRING INJURY TO CONSUMERS THROUGH
CONTROL OF PROVIDERS' OUTPUT IN THE HEALTH
CARE SETrING
Although the U.S. Healthcare court was not alone when it
declined to find monopsony power arising from the
exclusionary restraint under investigation, generally courts
should be more circumspect in their analysis. Monopsonistic
purchasing power of an HMO over providers under an
exclusionary restraint can lead to a suboptimal level of provid-
er service and supracompetitive pricing for their services.3 6
As Mandeville suggests, control over supplier prices and output
offends the principles guiding the application of antitrust
law.317 Thus, courts must examine carefully the degree to
which market conditions create a monopsonistic environment in
the context of an exclusionary restraint imposed by an HMO
314. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. Healthcare court's
investigation of a Sherman § 2 violation).
315. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 599 (1st Cir. 1993). Like
Kartell and Ocean State, this opinion is from the First Circuit. However, the court does not
expressly rely on precedent in its holding.
316. See supra part V (depicting these anticompetitive effects).
317. See supra notes 258-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Mandeville case).
460 [Vol. 6:391
UNBRIDLED MANAGED CARE
over a group of providers.
Courts can determine the likelihood of anticompetitive
services by evaluating: i) the amount of the providers' services
consumed by the HMO; ii) the share of the consumer market
foreclosed by the HMO's exclusionary practices; and, iii) the
existence of barriers to entry that prevent new insurers who are
not subject to the exclusionary restraint from entering the mar-
ket.318 Despite the inconsistent opinions in this area, several
courts have given weight to such factors in understanding po-
tentially monopsonistic situations.319 In future cases involving
the potential for monopsonistic purchasing power in an
exclusionary relationship between an HMO and a group of
providers, lawyers and judges also should look for indications
that these conditions have been met in the subject health care
market. Once they have elucidated this aspect of the
anticompetitive effects arising out of exclusionary behavior,
then the court can adjudicate these cases in a manner that
better accords with the goals of antitrust law.
A. HMO Consumption of the Providers' Services
Before an HMO can use its exclusionary restraint to obtain
control over its providers' price and output, it first must be-
come a vital part of the providers' normal operations by con-
suming a significant amount of their services. To determine the
importance of an HMO to a group of providers, courts should
investigate the percentage of the providers' revenues that come
from the potentially monopsonistic HMO."' A court might
318. See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text (illustrating the significance of these
elements to the economic model of a monopsonistic HMO).
319. See supra notes 291,299,301,311, and 312.
320. See, e.g., Westchester Radiological Assoc. v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 707 F.
Supp. 708, 714-15 n.19 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 884 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1095 (1990) (assuming BCIBS's market power despite its belief in the inaccuracy of
plaintiff's findings that BCBS accounted for 30% of the revenues of the hospitals in the relevant
market); Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir.
1985) (finding a high market share where BCBS accounted for about 50% of all revenues for
hospitals in Indiana); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 969 n.26 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990) (finding market power where BCfBS controlled 18% of the
plaintiff hospital's revenues). Note that Westchester Radiological and Reazin both look at the
market power wielded over discrete units of providers. Ball Memorial, however, looked at the
statewide average share of the providers' income. The plaintiff's claim in Ball Memorial revolved
around many hospitals throughout the state facing different markets. Thus the court had to
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decide that these revenues are crucial to the existence of the
providers if it found that decreased revenues from the HMO
would render the providers financially nonviable.32' Such a
condition would occur where the providers need the revenue
generated by the present consumption of services by the HMO
to help cover their high fixed costs.3' A court could examine
whether a provider could cover its fixed costs regardless of the
range of services the HMO demanded.3z If the HMO is only
a small entity compared to other payors, then the providers
might force the HMO to accept the same package of services
for its enrollees as that received by every other payor in the
market. In that case, the interests of all payors would dominate
over the interests of the HMO.324 If the providers need the
HMO to cover their fixed costs, however, they would be more
likely to provide only the services for which the HMO is
willing to provide reimbursement. In this way, they would
avoid incurring any unrecoverable expenses. Under these cir-
sacrifice the accuracy that comes from a more specific provider-by-provider analysis to accom-
modate the nature of the parties.
The DOJ and the FTC state that they examine a monopsonistic market in an analogous
fashion to a monopolistic market. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41,552
(1992). Since they will calculate a monopolistic market's concentration by summing the squares
of the shares of the consumer market held by all the firms in a market, they will calculate a
monopsonistic market's concentration by summing the squares of the shares of the seller market
held by all the firms in a market when considering the effects of a merger between two powerful
buyers. Id. at 41,557-58. Hence, similar to the court's examining the percentage of provider
revenues coming from a powerful insurer, the DOJ and the FrC also give weight to the degree of
the buyers' consumption of the sellers' product.
321. Cf Pauly, Monopsony Power, supra note 196, at 79 (asserting that a necessary
precondition of insurer monopsonistic power over providers is that providers are in a worse
position with lower patient volume).
322. See supra notes 200, 202 and accompanying text (discussing the high fixed costs of
providers).
323. Even if a provider would be unable to cover its fixed costs without the HMO's current
revenues, courts also should look at the ability of the provider to shift its costs onto some of its
other payors. See, e.g., Ball Memorial, 784 F.2d at 1340 (discussing the tendency among hospitals
to shift costs when they do not receive enough reimbursement from a major insurer to cover their
costs). Though cost structure analysis can be very informative, courts are reluctant to examine this
complicated area. See, e.g., id. (discouraging courts from determining if insurance rates are "cost
justified").
324. See Melnick et a, supra note 180, at 231 (suggesting that a PPO should contract with
smaller hospitals where the PPO could exert greater leverage in negotiations due to the greater
dependence of the hospital on the PPO's patient volume). A lack of leverage leads to increased
provider pricing. See id. at 227 (finding that occupancy rate has a positive correlation with hospi-
tal rates in a market with little excess capacity). Hence, when faced with unclear cost data, courts
also can look at whether the provider is charging the HMO less for its services than it charges
other payors as one sign of the increased bargaining power of the HMO relative to other payors.
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cumstances, the court should be more willing to find that the
exclusionary restraint has led to undue monopsonistic power.
B. Foreclosure of the Patient Market
Even if the providers have developed a dependence on the
HMO for their financial well-being, the exclusionary restraint
effectively must block access to a large percentage of the pa-
tient market before the HMO can control the providers' output
and price. The providers' ability to find other payors willing to
cover the costs of providing optimal care would prevent the
potentially monopsonistic HMO from limiting the providers'
range of services through suboptimal pricing unless the HMO
truly has foreclosed a large segment of the patient base.3" A
court should examine the share of the enrollee population fore-
closed by the potentially monopsonistic HMO." In determin-
ing the foreclosed market, courts should use the market defini-
tion for providers as delineated in the discussion of raising
rivals' costs, which defines the characteristics of the market in
which providers compete for patients.327 Within this market,
courts can measure the degree of foreclosure by adding togeth-
er the market shares of all the HMOs operating in this market
because the exclusionary relationship prevents the providers
from accessing the enrollees of other HMOs.s If an
325. Cf. Pauly, Monopsony Power, supra note 196, at 79 (stating that providers must not be
able to replace their patient base in order to prove monopsonistic power on the part of an insurer).
326. See, e.g., Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 692 F.
Supp. 52, 52-58 (D.R.I. 1988) aff d, 883 F.2d 1101 (lst Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027
(1990) (finding market power for BCIBS after establishing that it controlled between 62.8% and
80% of the insured Rhode Island market); Westchester Radiological Assoc. v. Empire Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 707 F. Supp. 708,714-15 n.19 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd 884 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied 493 U.S. 1095 (1990) (assuming market power based on plaintiff's claim that BCIBS
controlled 80% to 90% of all insureds in the relevant Downstate market); Ball Memorial, 784 F.2d
at 1330 (finding a high market share where BCIBS covered a range of 27% to 80% of all patients,
depending upon the hospital's location); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951,969
(10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990) (finding market power when BC/BS had
control of 47% to 62% of all Kansas insureds). Note that some of these cases look broadly at state
markets as opposed to the local markets where the insurer practicably can exert its leverage.
Future cases dealing specifically with HMO power might more carefully define the relevant
market.
327. See supra parts IV.A.I.b, IV.A.2.b (defining the health care market as three separate
product markets for primary, secondary, and tertiary care along with three accompanying
geographic markets).
328. In some markets, this foreclosure can be significant. For instance, HMO enrollment
figures range from 30% in California to 65% in the District of Columbia. BERmAN & ROSE, supra
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exclusionary restraint leads to both the HMO's consumption of
a significant amount of the providers' services and foreclosure
of an appreciable amount of the consumer market, courts
should be attentive to the danger of monopsonistic, anticompet-
itive effects of this agreement.
C. Barriers to Entry
Even where the HMO has succeeded in foreclosing a sig-
nificant part of the consumer market through its exclusionary
restraint, it can exercise monopsonistic power only if there are
significant barriers to entry that prevent new insurers not sub-
ject to the restraint from altering present enrollment patterns. A
new non-HMO insurer would not be subject to the
exclusionary restraint because the restraint only forbids the
providers from working with other HMOs. If this insurer cap-
tured a significant percentage of the HMO enrollee market,
then it might request the providers under the restraint to pro-
vide an optimal level of care at an optimal price, which would
prevent the potentially monopsonistic HMO from exerting its
leverage. Thus, barriers to entry to the HMO consumer market
are another factor courts must examine to determine the likeli-
hood of success of an HMO's exclusionary restraint in gaining
monopsonistic control.329
Courts should find many such barriers. As HMO enrollees
prefer the unique features offered by HMOs,"' consumer
preferences act as a major obstacle for non-HMO insurers try-
ing to capture HMO market share. In addition to the loyalty to
their present type of insurance, consumers also exhibit a loyal-
ty to their present insurer.33 The strength of these bonds
note 7, at 49. This trend towards managed care could continue to grow for quite some time.
According to the president of the Group Health Association of America, "'[t]he growth in HMO
enrollment will not only continue, it will accelerate.'" Mike Mitka, HMO Enrollments Are Still
Rising, But AtA Lower Rate, AM. MED. NEws, May 25, 1992, at 13. Other experts quoted in this
article temper this bullishness by saying that further HMO growth depends upon factors like the
political climate and changing consumer attitudes. Id. at 17. Enrollment in HMOs and other forms
of managed care has not yet peaked, and it continues to consume certain markets.
329. See, e.g., supra note 301 and accompanying text (discussing the Ball Memorial court's
treatment of the issue); see also note 312 and accompanying text (discussing the barriers to entry
to the insurance market found by the Reazin court).
330. See supra part IV.A.I.a (discussing the lack of cross-elasticity between HMO and FFS
insurance).
331. See Pauly, Monopsony Power, supra note 196, at 80 (describing the finding of per-
464 [Vol. 6:391
UNBRIDLED MANAGED CARE
would reinforce the barrier to entry for a new non-HMO insur-
er. Even when consumers are concerned primarily with price, a
new non-HMO insurer could not compete effectively because
of its higher costs. Initially, a new insurer would face high
costs by promoting its product to both providers and consum-
ers.332 Operationally, a non-HMO insurer likely would experi-
ence greater costs if it did not work in a capitation system
similar to HMOs.333 Thus, HMO consumers probably would not
be attracted to the prices that a new non-HMO insurer could
offer. Without any real threat to its monopsonistic power, an
HMO could attain an unfettered ability to reduce its provider
costs by reducing their output throughout the existence of the
exclusive agreement. Courts should presume antitrust liability
under the circumstances because an HMO can create such
anticompetitive effects through its consumption of the
providers' services and through its exclusion of other actual
and potential rival payors.
D. Conduct
Yet even if a court finds this monopsonistic power, it
should examine further whether the insurer's conduct in con-
structing the exclusionary restraint reinforces the tendency
towards anticompetitive effects. Such investigation acts as a
necessary check to finding liability for what might be legiti-
mate competitive conduct that actually furthers the goals of the
antitrust laws by creating efficiency within a market.334
sistence in the purchase of health care insurance).
332. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text (explaining the costs incurred in at-
taining goodwill for physicians entering a market); KuZmNs, supra note 33 (explaining that HMOs
spend enormous amounts on advertising). Recouping these initial expenses also could be a
protracted process because consumers usually consider buying new insurance only once a year,
which detracts from the net present value of an investment in a new health insurance product.
Pauly, Monopsony Power, supra note 196, at 80.
333. As explained supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text, capitation lowers costs from
FFS insurance because providers who bear some financial risk usually have an incentive to
practice more cost-efficiently. Thus any FFS-based health insurance product likely would
experience higher costs than an HMO. As even PPOs work on a discounted FFS basis, they are
not likely to be strong competitors with HMOs along price lines. See Freiburg, supra note 10, at
586-87 (describing PPO reimbursement).
334. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984)
(stating that "[iut is not enough that a single firm appears to 'restrain trade' unreasonably, for even
a vigorous competitor may leave that impression"). Because sometimes ostensible anticompetitive
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In this situation courts may consider factors similar to
those suggested in the discussion of raising rivals' costs: i) the
length of the term of the agreement; ii) the rigidity of the re-
straint; iii) the amount of pressure the dealer places on the
supplier; iv) the intent of management; v) the size of the firms;
and, vi) the nature of the purchasers.35 If a court finds that
the HMO's dealings with its providers are commensurate with
its needs to be a viable competitor in the market, it might con-
clude that the HMO permissibly is trying simply to create syn-
ergies through integration.336 Under such circumstances, the
HMO likely will pass on its cost savings to its enrollees. If a
court finds, however, that the HMO has imposed restrictions
that give it a degree of control in excess of what it needs to
remain competitive, the courts could assume that the HMO will
use its power to gain illicit monopsonistic profits. This could
be accomplished by decreasing the prices it pays for providers'
services through decreasing the range of their outputs with no
concomitant price reduction for its enrollees. In such situations,
the court should consider enjoining the exclusionary restraint
imposed by the HMO.
E. Performance
Once an exclusionary restraint has been in place for a
sufficient period of time, a court also may look at the effects
of the relationship on the market.337 Specifically, it can exam-
practices actually further efficiency, the courts generally have required "the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident" as part of a § 2 violation. See supra note
281 and accompanying text (listing the requirements for a Sherman § 2 cause of action).
Courts vary as to the standard of conduct necessary to find an antitrust violation. See, e.g.,
Ocean State, 883 F.2d at 1112 (exculpating any conduct as long as there is at least one legitimate
business justification for it); Westchester Radiological Assoc. v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 707 F. Supp. 708, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 884 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1095 (1990) (finding that there never could be a § 2 violation for trying to reduce
providers' prices); Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1339 (7th
Cir. 1985) (requiring that there be some objective evidence of an anticompetitive intent beyond a
mere memo discussing the need to be aggressive in negotiations); and Reazin v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 963-65 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990) (finding
sufficiently egregious conduct when the insurer terminated the provider's contract in retaliation
for merging into a conglomerate that contained an HMO).
335. See supra part IV.B.
336. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (describing production efficiencies that
can come from vertical integration).
337. Cf. supra part IV.D (listing this factor as an indicator of whether rivals' costs have been
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ine the providers' output under the restraint as compared to the
output of other similar HMOs." 8 It also can compare the
medical loss ratio of the HMO imposing the restraint to that of
HMOs without restraints over their providers. If either of these
factors are lower than expected, a court might infer that the
exclusionary relationship has created anticompetitive effects. A
court also must take into account numerous macroeconomic
factors that can affect performance indicators.
F. Evaluation of Legal Precedent Examining Monopsony
Through Exclusionary Restraints
Similar to its treatment of the issue of raising rivals' costs,
the U.S. Healthcare court did not examine in detail the rela-
tionship between the HMO and the providers in question to
determine if there was the potential for monopsonistic injury in
the exclusionary relationship.339 The court should have exam-
ined the importance of the HMO to its providers, its foreclo-
sure of other payors, and the barriers to entry for new payors.
Following this investigation, it should have examined the
HMO's conduct and the performance of the parties to the rela-
tionship. Had it done so, the court might have found a likeli-
hood of anticompetitive effects on consumers and providers. At
a minimum, it could not have asserted that there are always
other buyers of physician services. The court, however, also
qualified its opinion by stating that physician exploitation was
not the main issue presented." Other courts have undertaken
the investigation of these criteria and have paved the way for
more insightful analysis into the potential for anticompetitive
effects.' When future courts examine cases involving
exclusionary restraints imposed by HMOs upon providers, they
should follow the heuristic of these well-reasoned opinions and
raised).
338. See supra notes 244, 250 (discussing what would indicate lower output in an 11MO
setting).
339. This discussion only evaluates issues raised in the U.S. Healthcare opinion. The
Marshfield court did not have occasion to question the ability of an HMO to have monopsonistic
leverage over providers because the employee-physicians owned the Marshfield Clinic. One
cannot have monopsonistic power over oneself.
340. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589,598 n.7 (1st Cir. 1993).
341. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
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explore all of the relevant issues.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Note has illustrated the dangers to consumers, com-
petitors, and providers of an HMO-provider agreement that
prohibits providers from offering their services to other HMOs.
It also has shown that proper adjudication of the antitrust laws
effectively can expose any danger presented by this situation.
As the wave of integration in health care intensifies, the likeli-
hood of antitrust injury also will increase. 42 As a result, the
courts will handle an increasing number of the types of cases
described herein.
Although this danger exists, the market can correct itself
without resorting to the courts if it succeeds in shifting the bal-
ance of power from the insurers to all the other players in the
industry. If consumers integrate into larger purchasing coopera-
tives, they can effectively check the power of a large
HMO." They can demand concessions, monitor price and
performance, and ultimately, threaten to invite a competing
HMO into the market if they are not satisfied with the present
system. Consumers also can enjoy increased power through
laws mandating disclosure about the extent to which HMOs are
profiting from cost containment measures.3" They can use
this information to reward with increased enrollment HMOs
that provide the most service per premium dollar.
On the provider side, a network of providers who have
integrated to form a selling cooperative can restrain
anticompetitive HMO activity to some degree. 5  The
342. See Flynn, supra note 16, at 101 (indicating that exclusionary restraints likely will
increase as a source of trouble in the health care setting). Because of this danger, Minnesota has
banned exclusive contracts between insurers and providers. Page, supra note 195, at 6.
343. See Mark A. Hall, The Role of Insurance Purchasing Cooperatives in Health Care Re-
form, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95, 98 (1994) (discussing proposals to develop cooperatives that
would allow small groups and individuals to buy health care like large groups).
344. See, e.g., Julie Johnsson, Physician and Patient Protection: California Assembly Sends
Sweeping Managed Care Law to Governor, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 19, 1994, at 3,7 (explaining
one aspect of a California law mandating plans to furnish the state with a detailed account of all
revenues and expenses annually).
345. Thus organized medicine has done heavy lobbying to try to get Congress to relax the
antitrust laws enough to allow collective negotiations with health plans and payers. John K.
Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Physicians and the Growth of Managed Care, 331 NEw ENG. J.
468 [Vol. 6:391
UNBRIDLED MANAGED CARE
providers' effectiveness at protecting their market position will
depend upon their ability to represent enough of the market
that the HMO cannot force them to compete too fiercely with
each other. If a balanced playing field evolves, the dangers
suggested by this Note will be diminished. The industry other-
wise will not be able to deflect an upsurge in protracted and
expensive antitrust litigation that will further increase health
care costs.
MED. 1167,1171 (1994).
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